Belief Ascription and De Re Communication

  • Yuan Ren
Part of the Studies in Computational Intelligence book series (SCI, volume 64)

Summary. Direct reference theorists and Fregeans have different opinions on how to explain belief reports of sentences containing proper names. In this paper I suggest an alternative way to understand how successful de re communication is possible, based on which I give an explanation of belief ascription that seems to avoid the shortcomings of both camps.


Semantic Content Direct Reference Successful Communication Linguistic Meaning Belief Ascription 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yuan Ren
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy & Institute of Logic and CognitionSun Yat-sen UniversityGuangzhouP. R. China

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