Abstract
Directive 2005/29/EC concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market was adopted on May 11, 2005. This contribution sets out the main contents of the Directive in brief, and then analyses the problem of the partial harmonisation of competition law, the extensive list of “per-se prohibitions” in the Annex to the Directive (the “blacklist”) and the Directive’s model consumer. Finally, the question of the implementation obligation (in particular of the “blacklist”) will be discussed.
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References
Follow-up document COM (2002) 346 final.
See the list of all intermediate documents in Gamerith, “Richtlinienvorschlag über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken — Möglichkeiten einer harmonischen Umsetzung in die nationale Rechtsordnung” 116 et seq. (2004) = Gamerith, “Der Richtlinienvorschlag über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken — Möglichkeiten einer harmonischen Umsetzung,” 2005 WRP 391, 433 et seq.
OJ L 149/22, June 11, 2005. The proposed Directive has already been discussed in detail in numerous contributions; cf. Gamerith supra note 2 and the references in this study; on the Directive itself, see Henning-Bodewig, 2005 GRUR Int. 629 et seq. and Handig, 2005 ÖBl 196 et seq.
The importance and scope of this vaguely worded regulation are disputed, cf. most recently Gamerith, 2005 WRP 391, supra note 2, at 411 with notes = Gamerith, supra note 2, at 54.
The last relevant documents dates from September 18, 2004 (Interinstitutional file 2001/0227 (COD)), Document No. 12498/04 — Amended Proposal for a Regulation by the European Parliament and Council Concerning Sales Promotion in the Internal Market — Political Agreement (Public Consultation); September 24, 2004 — Discussion in the Council leading to a Draft Comment on the Proposal for a Regulation by the European Parliament and Council concerning Sales Promotion in the Internal Market dated November 11, 2004, Document No. 14402/04; in the meantime, however, the proposal has been withdrawn by the Commission (cf. Communication by the Commission dated September 27, 2005, COM (2005) 462 final).
Hence the appropriate criticism in Veelken, “Kundenfang gegenüber dem Verbraucher,” 2004 WRP 1, 9; in agreement, Gamerith, 2005 WRP 391, supra note 2, at 407 = Gamerith, supra note 2, 42 et seq.
This fragmentation of competition law has been criticised strongly above all in Austrian and German literature; cf. for instance Gamerith, 2005 WRP 391, supra note 2, at 413 et seq. = Gamerith, supra note 2, at 56 et seq.; Glöckner, in: Harte-Bavendamm & Henning-Bodewig (eds.), “UWG” Introduction B, notes 176 et seq., both with further references (2004).
Decisions of the ECJ, March 7, 1990, Case No. C-362/88, 1990 ECR 667 — GB-INNO-BM = 1991 ZfRV 37; May 18, 1993, Case No. C-126/91, 1993 ECR I-2361 — Yves Rocher = 1994 ZER 68 = 1993 GRUR 747 with comment by Bornkamm.
Decision of the ECJ, June 26, 1997, Case No. C-368/95, 1997 ECR I-3689 — Familiapress = 1997 wbl 333 = 1997 MR 158 = 1997 ZER 118 = 1997 ÖBl 229 = 1997 ecolex 586.
Directive 93/13/EEC of the Council dated April 5, 1993 concerning Abusive Clauses in Consumer Contracts. On the harmonisation of the legal situation in Austria after the implementation of this Directive, see Schuhmacher & Haybäck, 1999 Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht 361 et seq.
Helm, “Das Verbraucherleitbild des Europäischen Gerichtshofs und des Bundesgerichtshofs im Vergleich,” in: “FS Tilmann” 135, 140 et seq. (2003), pointed out in a detailed analysis that the German wording stands by itself in the context of the versions of the decision in other languages. The requirement that the modern consumer must be reasonable is not found in the decisions in other languages in this form. Thus in the English version of the “Gut Springenheide” decision, it states that the decisive factor is “the presumed expectations of an average consumer who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect” and in the French version “l’attente présumée d’un consommateur moyen, normalement informé et raisonnablement attentif avisé”. He concluded that the German wording was based on an inaccurate translation (loc.cit., 141). For this reason, minorities will be also protected against being misled, it being a matter for the national judge according to ECJ judicial practice to determine, according to his own law, the minimum percentage of consumers that must be misled by a statement (loc.cit., 142).
Köhler, in: Baumbach & Hefermehl, “Wettbewerbsrecht” Sec. 1 Act against Unfair Competition, note 20 (2004); likewise Helm, supra note 14, at 142.
Cf. decisions of the ECJ, July 9, 1997, joined Cases No. C-34/95, C-36/95 — De Agostini = 1997 wbl 423 = 1997 ZER 141 = 1997 MR 242 = 1997 ÖBl 306; and 1989 ECR 1235 — Buet = 1990 EuZW 69.
For more details on the model consumer of the Directive, see Helm, “Der Abschied vom „verständigen“ Verbraucher,” 2005 WRP 931 et seq.
Decision of the ECJ, May 10, 2001, Case No. C-144/99, note 17 — Com v. NL = 2001 wbl 215 = 2001 EuZW 437 with comment by Leible = 2001 EWS 484 with comment by Micklitz; cf. also the final pleadings by Attorney General Geelhoed in Case No. C-478/99, note 34; Herrmann, “Richtlinienumsetzung durch die Rechtsprechung” 210 et seq., 244 (2003); Case No. C-162/99 — Com v. I, note 22 = 2001 wbl 78 = 2001 ZER 17 = 2001 ZASB 15; Case No. C-478/99, note 21 = 2002 wbl 215 = 2002 ZER 148; final pleadings by Attorney General Geelhoed in Case No. C-58/02, note 35; final pleadings by Attorney General Tizzano in Case No. C-144/99, notes 9 und 36.
Decision of the ECJ, May 10, 2001, Case No. C-144/99, note 17, 18 — Com v. NL = 2001 wbl 215 = 2001 EuZW 437 = 2001 ZER 113. Cf. recently Decision of the ECJ, January 7, 2004, C-58/02 — Com v. Spain = 2004 ZER 5.
Gamerith, supra note 2, at 112 = Gamerith, 2005 WRP 391, supra note 2, at 432.
Klamert, “Zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie gegen unlautere Geschäftspraktiken,” 2005 ecolex 95 et seq.; likewise Kucsko, “Memo: Wider die Harmonisierungsresistenz,” 2005 ecolex 96 et seq.
Glöckner, “Richtlinienvorschlag über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken, deutsches UWG oder die schwierige Umsetzung von europarechtlichen Generalklauseln,” 2004 WRP 936, 941 et seq.
Cf. supra note 19.
This view is also supported by Seichter, “Der Umsetzungsbedarf der RL über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken,” 2005 WRP 1087, 1094 et seq and Glöckner & Henning-Bodewig, “EG-Richtlinie über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken: Was wird aus dem “neuen” UWG?,” 2005 WRP 1311, 1323; for a more detailed analysis of the implementation requirements see Schuhmacher, “Zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken,” in: Gruber & Rüffler (eds.), “Gesellschaftsrecht, Wettbewerbsrecht, Europarecht. Hans-Georg Kappensteiner zum 70. Geburtstag” 139 et seq. (2007).
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Schuhmacher, W. (2007). The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. In: Hilty, R.M., Henning-Bodewig, F. (eds) Law Against Unfair Competition. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, vol 1. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71882-6_7
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