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Unfair Competition Law in the United Kingdom

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Law Against Unfair Competition

Part of the book series: MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law ((MSIP,volume 1))

Abstract

It is a generally accepted truth that the United Kingdom has neither a general statute protecting traders against unfair competition nor has it developed a general tort of unfair competition.1 However, if one examines judicial dicta this conclusion appears less certain. For example, recently in Arsenal v. Reed (2003)2, the ECJ set out important principles as to when use of a registered trade mark is infringing use.3 However, in the United Kingdom where the case originated, Arsenal v. Reed has also been widely touted as the case in which the Court of Appeal finally recognised that domestic law does indeed encompass a general tort of unfair competition. In the case, the claimants were a football club who had a number of registered trade marks, including the word “Arsenal” and a shield logo, registered against a range of goods, including clothing; the defendant Mr. Reed was a trader who had sold clothing carrying the Arsenal trade marks outside the Club’s ground for many years. The claimant brought an action against Mr. Reed for registered trade mark infringement, which raised the questions subsequently addressed by the ECJ. The Club also sued Mr. Reed in the tort of passing off. In his judgement, Lord Justice Aldous noted obiter that the “cause of action traditionally called passing off, [is] perhaps best referred to as unfair competition”.4 In making this observation, Lord Justice Aldous took as his authority a statement made by Mr. Justice Cross as long ago as 19695 referring to another passing off case, Bollinger and Costa Brava Wine 6, decided in 1960.

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References

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  2. ECJ, November 12, 2002, Case C-206/01, 2003 ETMR 19 — Arsenal v. Reed.

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  86. He noted at 554 that it might be caught by the voluntary code of the ASA; but he also suggested this it is possible to denigrate a competitor’s mark without being dishonest. The courts’ failure to recognise the dilution aspects of the comparative advertising provisions of the TMA 1994 has been criticised by Carty, in her article, “Registered Trade Marks and Permissible Comparative Advertising,” 24 E.I.P.R. 294 (2002).

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  87. This approach was confirmed in the recent Court of Appeal decision, O2 Holdings v Hutchison 3G (2007). The issue arose as to when the use of a mark in comparative advertising, which isconfusingly similar to another’s registered trade mark, is necessary or idispensable for the purpose of complying with the Comparative Advertising Directive. According to Lord Justice Jacob: “To construe the CAD as not permitting that would not be to interpret it ‘in the sense most favourable’ to comparative advertising”. The questions has now been addressed to the ECJ. Court of Appeal, 2007 ETMR 284 — O2 Holdings Ltd. (formerly O2Ltd) v Hutchison 3G Ltd.

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Davis, J. (2007). Unfair Competition Law in the United Kingdom. In: Hilty, R.M., Henning-Bodewig, F. (eds) Law Against Unfair Competition. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, vol 1. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71882-6_11

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