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The Law Against Unfair Competition and Its Interfaces

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Law Against Unfair Competition

Part of the book series: MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law ((MSIP,volume 1))

Abstract

In a constitutional state (“Rechtsstaat”), committed to liberal values, the intervention of the legislator in the market forces of free competition requires a specific justification.1 Economically speaking, this justification rests on the consideration that, without any such intervention, a market failure would ensue after a certain period of time.2

The author wishes to thank Martin Pflüger, Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition, and Tax Law, for his valuable support, especially in document enquiry and analysis.

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References

  1. On the same basis rest e.g. Beater, “Unlauterer Wettbewerb” Sec. 12, note 31 et seq. (2002); Schünemann, in: Harte-Bavendamm & Henning-Bodewig (eds.), “Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, Kommentar” Sec. 1, note 34 (2004), (see also, however, Sec. 1, notes 20 and 24, as well as Sec. 3, note 163 et seq., extremely cautious concerning intervention by the State, this being substantiated essentially with regard to the alleged lack of knowledge concerning the effects of intervention in “the highly complex system as a whole”); Sambuc, in: Harte & Henning, ibidem, Intro. F, note 206; Köhler, in: Hefermehl, Köhler & Bornkamm (eds.), “Wettbewerbsrecht” Intro. to the Law Against Unfair Competition, note 1.33 (25th ed. 2007).

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  2. With regard to the topic of a market failure also infra 3.4; cf. for definitions of the concept of a market failure Gabler, “Wirtschaftslexikon” L-Z, Vol. 2 (12th ed. 1988); Geigant, Haslinger, Sobotka & Westphal (eds.), “Lexikon der Volkswirtschaft” (7th ed. 2000); Dichtl & Issing (eds.), “Vahlens großes Wirtschaftslexikon” L-Z, Vol. 2 (2nd ed. 1993); see also with regard to the topic as a whole Fritsch, Wein & Ewers, “Marktversagen und Wirtschaftspolitik: mikroökonomische Grundlagen staatlichen Handelns” 81 (6th ed. 2005); following essentially the same approach Brüning, in: Harte & Henning (eds.), supra note 1, at Intro. F, note 127; see also Gordon, “Systemische und fallbezogene Lösungsansätze für Marktversagen bei Immaterialgütern,” in: Ott & Schäfer (eds.), “Ökonomische Analyse der rechtlichen Organisation von Innovationen” 328 et seq. (1994) (related to US intellectual property law); by the same author, “Asymmetric market failure and prisoner’s dilemma in intellectual property,” 17 Dayton Law Review 853 et seq. (1991–1992); Bergh & Lehmann, “Informationsökonomie und Verbraucherschutz im Wettbewerbs-und Warenzeichenrecht,” 1992 GRUR Int. 591 (market failure as a result of an information deficit); in a similar context Huntley & Stephen, “Unfair Competition, Consumer Deception, and Brand Copying: An Economic Perspective,” 15 International Review of Law and Economics 448 et seq. (1995).

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  3. This has been analysed much more thoroughly with regard to patent law than with regard to copyright law; for a fundamental treatment, see in particular Machlup, “Die wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen des Patentrechts,” 1961 GRUR Ausl. 373 et seq., 473 et seq., 524 et seq.; also in detail with regard to the mechanisms in general — however, with a strong emphasis on physical property — Lehmann, “Eigentum, geistiges Eigentum, gewerbliche Schutzrechte — Property Rights als Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen zur Förderung des Wettbewerbs,” 1983 GRUR Int. 356 et seq., in particular 360; similarly critical Beater, “Nachahmen im Wettbewerb” 357 (1995); see also Oppenländer, “Die wirtschaftspolitische Bedeutung des Patentwesens aus der Sicht der empirischen Wirtschaftsforschung,” 1982 GRUR Int. 598 et seq., in particular 599. More recently e.g. Kraßer, “Patentrecht” 34, as well as 43 et seq. (5th ed. 2004); Pretnar, “Die ökonomische Auswirkung von Patenten in der wissensbasierten Marktwirtschaft,” 2004 GRUR Int. 776 et seq.

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  5. With regard to the nature of competition in particular e.g. Köhler, in: Hefermehl, Köhler & Bornkamm, supra note 1, at Intro., note 1.23, in terms of which one deals with “an extremely complex set of facts which, on the one hand, presupposes certain circumstances so that it can take place and develop whatsoever, on the other hand, however, because of its manifold functions can be understood in terms of the most diverse aspects and in the light of different objectives”. The concept of competition thus serves both the purpose of characterising the behavioural processes of various enterprises in a certain market and the relations inter se concerning them which arise therefrom and with the market partners on the opposite market side, as well as that of describing the market situation of a specific product including its substitute goods and characterising the organising principle dominating the economy as a whole.

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  6. With regard to the effect of encouragement through exclusive rights (in particular with regard to patent rights) Kraßer, supra note 3, at 34, 43 et seq. and 45 et seq.; Lehmann, 1983 GRUR Int. 360; Oppenländer, 1982 GRUR Int. 599, 600 et seq.; Pretnar, 2004 GRUR Int. 776 et seq.

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  7. Particularly clear Kur, “Funktionswandel von Schutzrechten: Ursachen und Konsequenzen der inhaltlichen Annäherung und Überlagerung von Schutzrechtstypen,” in: Schricker, Dreier & Kur (eds.), “Geistiges Eigentum im Dienst der Innovation” 23 et seq., in particular 32 et seq. (“erosion of the limits of protective rights”) (2001); by the same author, “A New Framework for Intellectual Property Rights — Horizontal Issues,” 2004 IIC 1 et seq., in particular 19; Sambuc, in: Harte & Henning (eds.), supra note 1, at Intro. F, note 185 et seq., 204 et seq.; by the same author, “Der UWG Nachahmungsschutz” note 35 et seq. (1996); Köhler, in: Hefermehl, Köhler & Bornkamm (eds.), supra note 1, at Sec. 4 Law Against Unfair Competition, note 9.4; Beater, supra note 1, at Sec. 1, note 71 (cf. with regard to the often inconcise approach of the courts, however, also note 76); Weihrauch, “Der unmittelbare Leistungsschutz im UWG” 240 (2001); Keller, “Der wettbewerbsrechtliche Leistungsschutz — Vom Handlungsschutz zur Immaterialgüterrechtsähnlichkeit,” in: Ahrens, et al. (eds.), “FS Erdmann” 595 et seq. (2002); see also Beyerlein, “Ergänzender Leistungsschutz gemäß § 4 Nr. 9 UWG als „geistiges Eigentum“ nach der Enforcement-Richtlinie (2004/48/EG),” 2005 WRP 1355, as well as generally Weber, “Dritte Spur zwischen absoluten und relativen Rechten?,” in: Honsell et al. (eds.), “Aktuelle Aspekte des Schuld-und Sachenrechts, FS Heinz Rey” 591 et seq. (Zurich 2003). For a fundamental treatment in the context of antitrust law, see Ullrich, “Lizenzkartellrecht auf dem Weg zur Mitte,” 1996 GRUR Int. 565 et seq. (“The protective right is only a means to the end inherent in competition, a competence to act, which makes possible behaviour promoting competition, i.e. aimed at individually maximising profit, but it is not already an end, incentive or reward itself, neither as such nor as a system.... [Intellectual property]... permits... only exploiting the forces of competition which may already be found in the market order.” [translation]), as well as in particular also Heinemann, “Immaterialgüterschutz in der Wettbewerbsordnung” 619 et seq. (2002). See in this context also e.g. BGH, October 10, 1971, I ZR 12/70, 1972 GRUR 189 et seq. — Wandsteckdose II.

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  8. Explanatory statement of the German Government to Sec. 1 of the Act Against Unfair Competition (BT-Drucks 15/1487) at 16; Glöckner, “Europäisches Lauterkeitsrecht” 7 (2006); Köhler, in: Hefermehl, Köhler & Bornkamm (eds.) supra note 1, at Intro., note 1.24 (“competition as a behavioural process”), as well as Sec. 1, note 43; by the same author, “Zur Konkurrenz lauterkeitsrechtlicher und kartellrechtlicher Normen,” 2005 WRP 645 et seq., in particular 646, 653; see also Fezer, “Modernisierung des deutschen Rechts gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb auf der Grundlage einer Europäisierung des Wettbewerbsrechts,” 2001 WRP 997. See also for a more precise definition of the concept of “a law of market behaviour”, however, infra 5.2.

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  9. See also Fritsch, Wein & Ewers, supra note 2, at 81; Köhler, in: Hefermehl, Köhler & Bornkamm (eds.), supra note 1, at Intro., note 1.48; critical concerning “subjecting market results to norms” Schünemann, in: Harte & Henning (eds.), supra note 1, at Sec. 3, note 163 et seq.: “Even if such a conflict concerning the objectives existed, it would have to be decided in favour of the freedom of competition, as prosperity not accompanied by freedom would be the democratically as well as ethically unacceptable alternative” (translation). Once a constitution or, at the European level, the EC Treaty lays down certain values, it will, however, be difficult to actually avoid ensuring that the law deriving therefrom is not directed at realising these values. This covers also competition law — as the core of the law of market behaviour — as long as this concentrates on the indispensable minimum (cf. also supra note 1) and freedom is not restricted beyond what is unavoidable. In so far, the conclusion to the deliberations of Schünemann cited here appears too simplistic.

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  10. Cf. with regard to the interrelationship and the mutual dependence in particular e.g. Köhler, in: Hefermehl, Köhler & Bornkamm (eds.), supra note 1, at Intro., note 6.11 et seq.; Brüning, in: Harte & Henning (eds.), supra note 1, at Intro. F, note 125; Ohly, in: Piper & Ohly, “Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, Kommentar” Intro. note 72 et seq. (4th ed. 2006); cf. also Köhler, 2005 WRP 645 et seq., in particular 646 and 653; Fezer, supra note 9, at 999; Glöckner, supra note 9, 204 et seq.

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  11. Koitel, “Neues im estnischen Kartellgesetz,” 2002 WIRO 334 et seq.; as well as Engelbrekt, in: Harte & Henning (eds.), supra note 1, at Intro. E, note 72 et seq.; Henning-Bodewig, “Unfair Competition Law” at 101 et seq., with additional references, (2006).

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  12. Vida, “Anpassung des ungarischen Marken-und Wettbewerbsrechts an das Europarecht,” 2001 WIRO 172 et seq.; as well as Engelbrekt, in: Harte & Henning (eds.), supra note 1, at Intro. E, note 709 et seq.; Henning-Bodewig, supra note 14, at 157 et seq., with additional references.

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  13. In this regard e.g. Eisfeld, “Lettisches Wettbewerbs-und Kartellrecht,” 2004 WIRO 325 et seq.; as well as Engelbrekt, in: Harte & Henning (eds), supra note 1, at Intro. E, note 330 et seq.; Henning-Bodewig, supra note 14, at 183 et seq., with additional references.

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  14. Engelbrekt, in: Harte & Henning (eds.), supra note 1, at Intro. E, note 351 et seq.; Henning-Bodewig, id., at 187 et seq., with additional references.

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  15. Cf. in this regard Fezer, in: Fezer (ed.), “Lauterkeitsrecht, Kommentar zum UWG” Intro. E, note 39 et seq., in particular 41, Vol. 1 (2005); Glöckner, supra note 9, at 216; Keßler, “Vom Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs zum Recht der Marktkommunikation,” 2005 WRP 1204 et seq.; Ohly, in: Piper & Ohly, supra note 13, Intro. note 71 et seq.; see also the references in supra note 13.

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  16. Cf. in regard to the developments in particular Henning-Bodewig, “Das europäische Wettbewerbsrecht: Eine Zwischenbilanz,” 2002 GRUR Int. 391; Schricker & Henning-Bodewig, “Elemente einer Harmonisierung des Rechts des unlauteren Wettbewerbs in der Europäischen Union,” 2001 WRP 1368; see also previously Schricker, “Unlauterer Wettbewerb und Verbraucherschutz,” 1970 GRUR Int. 32 et seq.; Glöckner, supra note 9, 147 et seq.; in detail with regard to German law also Beater, “Verbraucherschutz und Schutzzweckdenken im Wettbewerbsrecht” (2000).

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  17. Directive 2005/29 of May 11, 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7, 98/27 and 2002/65 and Regulation No. 2006/2004 (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive), OJ L 149 from June 11, 2005, at 22 et seq.; see also in this volume Schuhmacher; generally with regard to harmonisation by virtue of Community law in the sphere of consumer protection law e.g. Fezer, 2001 WRP 989 et seq., in particular 991.

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  18. See with regard to the fact that the aims protected exist side by side and rank equally — which, in the final analysis, follows from the subject matter itself, and not only concerning cases, where all relevant interests worthy of protection are reflected in one uniform legal act — (so-called “integrated model” in the sense of a “trias of protected aims”), in particular e.g. Köhler, in: Hefermehl, Köhler & Bornkamm (eds.), supra note 1, at Sec. 1, note 40; Henning-Bodewig & Schricker, “Stellungnahme des Max-Planck-Instituts für ausländisches und internationales Patent-, Urheber und Wettbewerbsrechts zum Grünbuch zum Verbraucherschutz in der EU KOM (2002) 531 endg.,” 2002 GRUR Int. 320; Gamerith, “Neue Herausforderungen für ein europäisches Lauterkeitsrecht,” 2003 WRP 162; Glöckner, supra note 9, 447 et seq.; Beater, “Europäisches Recht gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb — Ansatzpunkte, Grundlagen, Entwicklung, Erforderlichkeit,” 2003 ZEuP 11 et seq., in particular 48; by the same author, supra note 1, at Sec. 13, note 14; focusing rather more on consumer protection Keßler & Micklitz, “Die Harmonisierung des Lauterkeitsrechts in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und die Reform des UWG” 16 et seq. (2003).

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  19. Cf. for details the country reports of Henning-Bodewig, supra note 14, at 69 et seq., with additional references; Glöckner, supra note 9, 331 et seq. and 341 et seq.; Schricker & Henning-Bodewig, supra note 19, at 1367 et seq., in particular 1379 et seq.; Micklitz & Keßler, “Europäisches Lauterkeitsrecht — Dogmatische und ökonomische Aspekte einer Harmonisierung des Wettbewerbsverhaltensrechts im europäischen Binnenmarkt,” 2002 GRUR Int. 885 et seq., in particular 894; by the same authors, “Funktionswandel des UWG,” 2003 WRP 919 et seq., in particular 928 et seq.; Keßler & Micklitz, supra note 21, at 36 et seq.; Schünemann, “‘Unlauterkeit’ in den Generalklauseln und Interessenabwägung nach neuem UWG,” 2004 WRP 929.

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  20. See with regard to the torts of “passing off” and “malicious falsehood” essentially applicable in Great Britain, but also the provisions of criminal and public law in particular Cornish & Llewelyn, “Intellectual Property” notes 1–15 et seq. and 15–19 et seq. (5th ed. 2003); Kitchin, “Kerly’s law of trade marks and trade names” notes 14–65 et seq. (13th ed. 2001). cf. in this regard also the overview in Ohly, “Richterrecht und Generalklausel im Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs” 19 et seq. (1997).

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  21. Cf. in this regard the analyses in Henning-Bodewig, 2002 GRUR Int. 389 et seq., in particular 391; by the same author, “Richtlinienvorschlag über unlautere Geschäftpraktiken und UWG-Reform,” 2004 GRUR Int. 183 et seq., in particular 189; Schricker & Henning-Bodewig, 2001 WRP 1368; Henning-Bodewig & Schricker, 2002 GRUR Int. 319 et seq.; Beater, 2003 ZEuP 11 et seq., in particular 46; Keßler & Micklitz, supra note 21, at 38 et seq.

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  22. Details are mentioned in the country reports in Harte & Henning (eds.), supra note 1, Intro. E, and Henning-Bodewig, supra note 14, at 69 et seq., with additional references; Schricker & Henning-Bodewig, 2001 WRP 1367 et seq., in particular 1368.

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  23. Supra note 20.

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  24. With regard to the discussion of the Directive, specifically of the significance of the scope of application having been limited to B2C practices, see Henning-Bodewig, “Die Richtlinie 2005/29/EG über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken,” 2005 GRUR Int. 629 et seq.; by the same author, 2004 GRUR Int. 183 et seq., in particular 189; Köhler, with regard to the implementation of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, 2005 GRUR 793 et seq.; Gamerith, 2003 WRP 162; Glöckner, supra note 9, 69 et seq.; see also in this volume Schuhmacher. Generally with regard to Community law against the background of the new German Law Against Unfair Competition, Lettl, “Gemeinschaftsrecht und neues UWG,” 2004 WRP 1079 et seq.

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  25. cf. e.g. zuleeg, in: von der groeben & schwarze (eds.), “vertrag über die europäische union und vertrag zur gründung der europäischen gemeinschaft” eg 3, note 8 (6th ed. 2003); ukrow, in: callies & ruffert, “kommentar des vertrages über die europäische union und des vertrages zur gründung der europäischen gemeinschaft — euv/eg” eg 3 n 11 (2nd ed. 2002); glöckner, supra note 9, 16 et seq.

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  26. see also zuleeg (id.), eg 3 n 8, also referring to the preamble of the ec treaty; schünemann, in: harte/henning (eds.), supra note 1, at sec. 3, notes 95 and 118 et seq.

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  27. For details, see Henning-Bodewig, 2002 GRUR Int. 395 et seq.; Micklitz & Kessler, 2002 GRUR Int. 891 et seq.

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  28. Article 2 (h) of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, supra note 20 does not constitute a successful attempt at laying down such criteria (cf. with regard to the even less successful formulation attempt in the proposal for the directive also Schünemann, in: Harte & Henning (eds.), supra note 1, at Sec. 3, note 95; in terms thereof “professional diligence” means “the standard of special skill and care which a trader may reasonably be expected to exercise towards consumers, commensurate with honest market practice and/or the general principle of good faith in the trader’s field of activity”. Although this makes it clear that not only actual forms of behaviour are decisive but also normative criteria, it is not clear, however, how the reference system is to be chosen. It would not be acceptable at any rate for the addressees of the norms themselves to decide on which norms of competition law regulating market behaviour should be applicable to them, as the system of free and undistorted competition (Art. 3 Para. 1 (g) and Art. 4 Para. 1 EC) is not such that it can be at the free disposition of the market participants (Schünemann, ibidem, Sec. 3, note 118 et seq.; critical also Henning & Bodewig, 2005 GRUR Int 631; less critical against the background of the objective of consumer protection Keßler & Micklitz, “Die Richtlinie 2005/29/EG über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken im binnenmarktinternen Geschäftsverkehr zwischen Unternehmen und Verbrauchern,” 49 Special zu BB 1 et seq., in particular 14 (2005)).

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  29. Cf. also in this regard generally Reich, “Binnenmarkt als Rechtsbegriff,” 1991 EuZW 203 et seq.

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  30. Otherwise than in the case of antitrust law, most Member States in the sphere of the law against unfair competition base the competition law connecting factor on the “Marktortprinzip” (the law of the country where the market is affected by the unfair competition act in question); see e.g. Lettl, 2004 WRP 1086; Drexl, in: Rebmann, Säcker & Rixecker (eds.; editor: Sonnenberger), “Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch,” Vol. 11, “Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht, Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche (Arts. 50–245)” IntUnlWettbR, note 3 (4th ed. 2006). This has now also been laid down in Art. 6 of the planned Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (“ROME II” — see Common Position (EC) No. 22/2006, OJ C 289E/68 of November 28, 2006), which envisages to apply to non-contractual obligations arising out of an act of unfair competition the law of the country where competitive relations or the collective interests of consumers are or are likely to be directly and substantially affected. It is disputed whether the “effects doctrine” (“Auswirkungsprinzip”) internationally predominant in the sphere of antitrust law should also be applicable to the law against unfair competition; see in this regard e.g. Glöckner, supra note 9, 294 et seq., who argues that the “effects doctrine” — as a principle governing international commercial law as a whole (and also laid down in Art. 7 of the Rome II Regulation) — should also apply to the law against unfair competition, and, on the other hand, Drexl, ibidem, note 11 et seq., who, in view of the functionality of both areas of law, prefers, as regards the outcome, to retain the separate connection to the “Marktortprinzip” and the focus on illegally causing a certain effect in the market. Both concede, however, that both approaches in practice often lead to the same results. Cf. with regard to the conflict of laws question further Säcker, “Das UWG zwischen den Mühlsteinen europäischer Harmonisierung und grundrechtsgebotener Liberalisierung,” 2004 WRP 1200; Leistner, “Comments: The Rome II Regulation Proposal and its Relation to the European Country-of-Origin Principle,” in: Drexl & Kur (eds.), “Intellectual Property and Private International Law” 177 (2005); by the same author, “Unfair Competition Law Protection against Imitations: A Hybrid under the Future Art. 5 Rom II Regulation?,” in: Basedow, Drexl, Kur & Metzger (eds.), “Intellectual Property in the Conflict of Laws” 129 et seq. (2005); Glöckner, in: Harte & Henning (eds.), supra note 1, at Intro. C, note 1 et seq.; Köhler, in: Hefermehl, Köhler & Bornkamm (eds.), supra note 1, at Intro., note 5.1 et seq.; Buchner, “Rom II und das Internationale Immaterialgüter-und Wettbewerbsrecht,” 2005 GRUR Int. 1004 et seq.; Mankowski, “Was soll der Anknüpfungsgegenstand des (europäischen) Internationalen Wettbewerbsrechts sein?,” 2005 GRUR Int. 634 et seq.; Piepenbrock, “Die Bedeutung des Herkunftslandprinzips im europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht,” 2005 GRUR Int. 997 et seq.

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  31. In this sense also Fezer, 2001 WRP 993; more cautious Steindorff, “Unlauterer Wettbewerb im System des EG-Rechts,” 1993 WRP 150; apparently also Säcker, 2004 WRP 1200, who emphasises the simplification and greater legal certainty and transparency and, therefore, the “reduction of market entry costs induced by the law”, to be achieved only by virtue of a harmonisation of the European law against unfair competition; “a teleological expansive force of European law” followed therefrom, which was also reflected in the steady displacement of the statute of market success (“Markterfolgsstatut”) in the law against unfair competition by the country of origin principle (translation).

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  32. In this sense justifiably critical Beater, 2003 ZEuP 45, referring to Adam Smith, “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” (1st ed., 1776, reprint Hackett Publishing Company 1993, at 11 (quoted from Beater) respectively reprint The University of Chicago Press, 1976, at 18): “Competition combines two opposing factors with each other, namely behaviour guided by self-interest and the general welfare, and is based on the paradox that the strict orientation of the individual by egotistical motives may have effects which benefit all. It is not the altruism or the benevolence of the baker which makes him get up during the night and has the effect that we are able to buy fresh bread and fresh rolls every day. Consequently, ideas of morality can also not be an appropriate measure to properly assess processes in competition in legal terms” (translation).

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  33. In support of drawing a clear line between the “economically founded claim to universality of the concept of unfairness and national morals” also Keßler & Micklitz, 49 Special zu BB 1 et seq., in particular 13 (2005), (“The reference system for determining unfairness derives from the economic constitution of the EU, that for morals from the relevant national context” (translation)).

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  34. Also against a mandatory obligation of Member States to adopt the general clause of Art. 5 of the Directive, referring to the requirements of “professional diligence”, Sosnitza, “Die Richtlinie über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken — Voll oder Teilharmonisierung?,” 2006 WRP 6 et seq.; Henning-Bodewig, “Das neue UWG — von Brüsseler Gnaden?,” in: Ohly, et al. (eds.), “FS Schricker” 710 et seq. (2005); Henning-Bodewig & Glöckner, “EG-Richtlinie über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken: Was wird aus dem “neuen” UWG?,” 2005 WRP 1327 et seq.; Seichter, “Der Umsetzungsbedarf der Richtlinie über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken,” 2005 WRP 1090 et seq.; in this sense already with regard to the proposal for the directive Henning-Bodewig, “Richtlinienvorschlag über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken und UWG-Reform,” 2004 GRUR Int. 190 et seq.; for Austria Gamerith, “Der Richtlinienvorschlag über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken — Möglichkeiten einer harmonischen Umsetzung,” 2005 WRP 430 et seq. In contrast, arguing in support of an adoption Köhler & Lettl, “Das geltende europäische Lauterkeitsrecht, der Vorschlag für eine EG-Richtlinie über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken und die UWG-Reform,” 2003 WRP 1050 et seq.; also Köhler, “Zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken,” 2005 GRUR 796; Lettl, 2004 WRP 1089; Veelken, “Kundenfang gegenüber dem Verbraucher — Bemerkungen zum EG-Richtlinienentwurf über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken,” 2004 WRP 17.

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  35. In the same sense, defining competition as “a process of selection” e.g. Köhler, in: Hefermehl, Köhler & Bornkamm, supra note 1, at Intro., notes 1.21, 1.22; Kirchner, “Innovationsschutz und Investitionsschutz für immaterielle Güter,” 2004 GRUR Int. 604 et seq. (competition as “a continuous process of creative destruction”); Beater, supra note 1, at Sec. 2, note 13 as well as Sec. 17, note 1, and Sec. 22, notes 3 and 38; the reference of Beater to the “adjudicator function” of consumers and commercial customers (Sec. 17, note 1) is, of course, rejected by Schünemann, in: Harte & Henning (eds.), supra note 1, at Sec. 1, note 11 (see supra note 28), because competition would thereby be reduced to “a process between rivals”. See also Beater, supra note 1, at Sec. 22, note 19 as well as Sec. 1, note 76, referring to the discrepancy of case law between the constant emphasis on freedom of competition and the protection actually granted (in particular in the form of so-called “ergänzender wettbewerbsrechtlicher Leistungsschutz” (“supplementary protection of achievement under competition law”); see also in this regard Ohly, supra note 47.

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  36. Beater, supra note 1, at Sec. 2, note 14 et seq., referring to a distribution of income “appropriately related to performance”; Weihrauch, supra note 8, at 240.

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  37. Beater, supra note 1, at Sec. 24, note 32; Weihrauch, supra note 8, at 170 et seq.; for a similar conclusion Kirchner, supra note 38, at 604 et seq.

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  38. Beater, supra note 1, at Sec. 22, note 36, and Sec. 24, note 43; Sambuc, in: Harte & Henning (eds.), supra note 1, at Intro. F, at note 548; in more detail in this regard Weihrauch, supra note 8, at 192 et seq.

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  39. Cf. in more depth with regard to these mechanisms and the different phases of innovation (or investment) and imitation in particular Weihrauch, supra note 8, at 170 et seq.

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  40. With regard to the concept of a market failure as such, see supra note 1.

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  41. Beater, supra note 1, at Sec. 22, note 38, and Sec. 24, note 43.

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  42. See also Beater, supra note 1, at Sec. 22, note 14.

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  43. Critically with regard to the “ergänzender wettbewerbsrechtlicher Leistungsschutz” (“supplementary protection of achievement under competition law”) e.g. Ohly, “Gibt es einen Numerus clausus der Immaterialgüterrechte?,” in: “FS Schricker”, supra note 37, at 110 et seq., with additional references, in particular in supra notes 37 and 38; Sambuc, in: Harte & Henning (eds.), supra note 1, at Intro. F, note 212; Beater, supra note 1, at Sec. 22, notes 16 and 18 et seq. and Sec. 1, note 76; see also Weihrauch, supra note 8, at 240; cf. e.g. with regard to the question — in its answer to be denied, however — whether the Swiss Art. 5 (c) UWG has the character of a genuine right aimed at the protection of achievements, Hilty, “‘Leistungsschutz’ made in Switzerland?,” in: Ahrens et al. (eds.), “FS Ullmann” (2006), at 643 et seq., with additional references, also with regard to the relevant discussion in Germany (in particular notes 2, 5 and 6).

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  44. With regard to the concept of “wettbewerbliche Eigenart” e.g. Kur, “Der wettbewerbliche Leistungsschutz — Gedanken zum wettbewerbsrechtlichen Schutz von Formgebungen, bekannten Marken und ‘Characters’,” 1990 GRUR 7 et seq.; Sambuc, “Die Eigenart der ‘wettbewerblichen Eigenart’ — Bemerkungen zum Nachahmungsschutz von Arbeitsergebnissen durch § 1 UWG,” 1986 GRUR 130 et seq.; by the same author in: Harte & Henning (eds.), supra note 1, Sec. 4, note 47 et seq.; Köhler, in: Hefermehl, Köhler & Bornkamm (eds.), supra note 1, Sec. 4, note 9.24 et seq.; with regard to the (double) function and scope of this concept in German law — namely as a concept of achievement (“Leistungsbegriff”) and as a distinctive feature (“Erkennungsmerkmal”) — in particular also Weihrauch, supra note 8, at 52 et seq. (with regard to the latter it is stated that it delimits “potential objects of imitation from socalled commodities, mass-produced articles or relevant ordinary goods. The nature of the ‘wettbewerbliche Eigenart’ here is determined by the fact that it does not itself serve as a criterion of bones mores (’sittenwidrigkeit’). A decision on bones mores is based on weighing the particular circumstances which have their basis outside the product of achievement. The ‘wettbewerbliche Eigenart’, as a requirement for determining whether these particular circumstances give rise to immorality, fulfils a function of assistance and an exclusionary function.” [translation]).

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  45. In terms of settled case law it is well so that alongside “wettbewerbliche Eigenart” there must additionally exist special circumstances which make the imitation appear unfair, whereby “an interdependency exists between the degree of ‘wettbewerbliche Eigenart’, the method and the intensity of a takeover as well as their particular competition circumstances. The greater the ‘wettbewerbliche Eigenart’ and the higher the degree of a takeover, the fewer are the requirements concerning the particular circumstances, establishing the unfairness in competition of the imitation” (translation); in this sense e.g. BGH, July 12, 2001, I∼ZR 40/99, 2002 GRUR 86, 89, with additional references — Laubhefter; Sambuc, in: Harte/Henning (eds.), supra note 1, at Sec. 4, note 6 et seq., in particular 29, justifiably refers to the fact, however, that “not only the modalities and circumstances accompanying an imitation may contribute to a finding of unfairness, but at least also the quality of the imitated product which entailed an effort (the ‘achievement’)”( translation); he argues that the German Supreme Court mitigates the dogma of the purely behaviour-based conception of protection against imitations in terms of the Law Against Unfair Competition by precisely this system of interdependencies. See also Keller, supra note 8, at 598; Müller-Laube, “Wettbewerbsrechtlicher Schutz gegen Nachahmung und Nachbildung ge-werblicher Erzeugnisse,” 1992 ZHR 480 et seq., in particular 501 et seq. and 511.

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  46. Against this background seemingly reduced too extensively to equating the protection of investments with “property” — the “genuine” (i.e. competition law-based) protection of investments cannot be concerned with the latter —, Kirchner, supra note 8, 2004 GRUR Int. 604 et seq.

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  47. Similarly critical Beater, supra note 1, at Sec. 22, note 18: “Often terms such as ‘parasitism’ (‘Schmarotzen’), ‘insertion’ (‘Einschieben’), ‘adherence’ (‘Anhängen’),’ slavish imitation’ (’sklavische Nachahmung’) or ‘organised acting’ (‘Planmäßigkeit’) are used in this context, which may convince the impartial reader and possibly also the parties in a competition process, but which are purely suggestive and do not offer any explanation” (translation).

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  48. In so far justifiably cautious Kirchner, supra note 38, 2004 GRUR Int. 604 et seq., where the protection of investments in terms of competition law and possible protection of investments in terms of special laws are not sufficiently distinguished, however.

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  49. Behind this comparison — aiming at the prevention of a potential market failure — one notices, in the final analysis, elements of the compensation criterion developed by Nicholas Kaldor and John Richard Hicks (“Kaldor-Hicks criterion”) aimed at extending the scope of application of so-called Pareto welfare economics. In terms of this criterion also those economico-political measures may be seen as enhancing the general welfare which cause losses to certain groups of the population, in so far as those benefiting from that measure are in a position to fully compensate the losers, without thereby again forfeiting all welfare gains achieved. With regard to the question of the welfare effect it is not important in this regard whether actual use is, in fact, made of the possibility. What is crucial is solely that the possibility of compensation exists. For, it must be expected that the redistribution effected by an economic measure is to a certain extent politically intended, so that no compensation is desired here. Cf. in detail Dichtl & Issing (eds.), “Vahlens großes Wirtschaftslexikon” A-K, Vol. 1 (2nd ed. 1987); see also Huntley & Stephen, supra note 2, at 449.

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  50. See also the references supra note 38.

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  51. Similar with reference to permeability Sambuc, in: Harte & Henning (eds.), supra note 1, at Intro. F, note 213; see also Beater, supra note 1, at Sec. 22, note 38 and — related to criteria concerning the legal protection of innovations — also, note 62 et seq.; Gordon, supra note 2 (1994), at 328 et seq., who — related to intellectual property rights — similarly argues in a competition law-oriented manner, namely by referring to an “asymmetry of market conditions” (where intellectual property rights are lacking, there must be a market failure, where intellectual property rights do exist, the market must function properly): see also by the same author, supra note 2 (1991–1992), at 853 et seq. To a certain extent with an apparently different approach Kirchner, supra note 38, 2004 GRUR Int. 604 et seq., who in respect of the protection of investments considers the question whether there has been an innovation decisive (whereas the question of instruments of the law against unfair competition is explicitly left aside) — an approach which in the light of the arguments presented here is not conclusive, if in every case the link is made with a potential market failure.

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  52. Particularities concerning the positive effects which may ensue as a result of exclusive rights, specifically in relation to their capacity to form the subject of legal transactions (or the potential willingness to grant licenses on the basis of protective rights), but which will not necessarily ensue — e.g. in the case of external factors such as transaction costs which are too high or the impossibility of identifying the holder of a right — will not be dealt with in more depth at this point; for a fundamental treatment in this regard, see Ullrich, “Grenzen des Rechtsschutzes: Technologieschutz zwischen Wettbewerbs-und Industriepolitik,” in: Schricker, Dreier & Kur, supra note 8, at 101 et seq.; see also in particular e.g. Gordon, supra note 2 (1994), at 347 and 360 et seq.; by the same author, supra note 2 (1991–1992), at 857.

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  53. Similar with regard to the difficulty of making predictions Schünemann, supra note 1, at Sec. 3, note 214 et seq.

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  54. The reasons provided at the time as regards the Directive on Databases are, for example, characteristic in this context (Directive 96/9 of March 11, 1996 on the legal protection of databases, OJ L 077 of March 27, 1996, 20 et seq.; in this regard infra 4.3.3.1 [“Databases”]), namely Recital 12, which makes a mere unfounded assertion (“an investment in modern information storage and processing systems will not take place within the Community unless a stable and uniform legal protection regime is introduced for the protection of the rights of makers of databases”), a statement which the EU Commission in its assessment of the effects of the Directive itself exposed as being false in the meantime (cf. infra note 84). Comparable analyses on the effects in other fields of European legal harmonisation are lacking from the outset.

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  55. In more depth in this regard Kur, 2004 IIC 1 et seq., as well as by the same author, “Die Harmonisierung des Lauterkeitsrechts durch Angleichungsmaßnahmen in angrenzenden Bereichen,” in: Schricker & Henning-Bodewig (eds.), “Neuordnung des Wettbewerbsrechts” 116 et seq. (1998/99).

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  56. Cf. in this sense also the foreword in Keßler & Micklitz, supra note 21, where it is stated that the emphasis so far has particularly been on the protection of individual competitors “against competition” in terms of private law rather than normatively safeguarding the process of competition as such, hence, that a “micro or even macro economic perspective... with regard to the organisation of fair competition — apart from isolated investigative approaches conducted in the 70s of the previous century — in order to obtain normative insights did not exist” (translation), this also being reflected in the fact that economists hardly addressed questions pertaining to the law against unfair competition.

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  57. Keßler & Micklitz, supra note 21, ibidem; see also Micklitz & Keßler, 2002 GRUR Int. 889. For a fundamental treatment with regard to all of the above, see Bultmann, Howells, Keßler, Micklitz, Radeideh, Reich, Stuyck & Voigt, Project Manager: Micklitz, “The Feasibility of a Legislative Framework on Fair Trading” November 2000 (available at <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/surveys/sur21_sum_en.pdf> status as at May 2006).

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  58. Supra note 20.

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  59. Supra 3.2, note 27.

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  60. Regulation No. 510/2006 of March 20, 2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs, replacing Regulation No. 2081/92 of July 14, 1992 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs, and Regulation No. 2082/92 of July 14, 1992 on certificates of specific character for agricultural products and foodstuffs, OJ L 208 of July 24, 1992, at 1 et seq. and OJ L 93 of March 31, 2006, at 12 et seq., respectively. Provisions explicitly dealing with geographical indications of origin may further be found in product-specific regulations, e.g. on the common organisation of the market in wine (Arts. 47 et seq., 50 of Reg. No. 1493/1999 of May 17, 1999, OJ L 179 of July 14, 1999, 1 et seq.), on the presentation of spirit drinks (Art. 5 Para. 3 (a) and (b) read with Annex II Reg. No. 1576/89 of May 29, 1989, OJ L 160 of June 12, 1989, at 1 et seq.) or on mineral waters (Art. 7 et seq. Directive 80/777 of July 15, 1980, OJ L 229 of August 30, 1980, at 1 et seq.).

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  61. Holding essentially the same view Beater, supra note 1, at Sec. 22, note 77 et seq., related e.g. to the public relations work of an enterprise, the discussion addressing geographical designations referring to the ECJ decision of November 10, 1992, Case C-3/91, 1993 GRUR Int. 76 et seq., in particular 78 — Exportur SA./. LOR SA et al, and further referring to the case law of national courts.

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  62. Kur, “Funktionswandel von Schutzrechten”, supra Funktionswandel von Schutzrechten: Ursachen und Konsequenzen der inhaltlichen Annäherung und Überlagerung von Schutzrechtstypen,” in: Schricker, Dreier & Kur (eds.), “Geistiges Eigentum im Dienst der Innovation” 23 et seq. note 8, at 27 et seq. (in particular supra note 18, referring to the approach of Ullrich, 1996 GRUR Int. 565 et seq.; in this regard supra note 8; see in this regard also by the same author, “Grenzen des Rechtsschutzes,” supra note 59, at 92).

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  63. Cf. with regard to all of the above in particular e.g. Eger, “Kommentar zu Helmut Köhler: Erweiterung des gewerblichen Rechtsschutzes durch UWG-Normen,” in: Ott & Schäfer (eds.), “Ökonomische Analyse der rechtlichen Organisation von Innovationen” 271 (1994); Huntley & Stephen, supra note 2, at 448 et seq. and 452; for a fundamental treatment, see Landes & Posner, supra note 4 (2003), at 166 et seq.; by the same authors, supra note 4 (Journal of Law and Economics), at 269 et seq.; see also Cooter & Ulen, supra note 4, 134 et seq.; Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics 488 et seq. (1970); Berg & Lehmann, 1992 GRUR Int. 591.

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  64. In this context, Eger, supra Kommentar zu Helmut Köhler: Erweiterung des gewerblichen Rechtsschutzes durch UWG-Normen,” in: Ott & Schäfer (eds.), “Ökonomische Analyse der rechtlichen Organisation von Innovationen” 271 (1994) note 74, at 271, refers to the possible negative effects of legal protection, mentioning the example of qualitatively identical products which a manufacturer offers under different trade mark names (as this sometimes occurs e.g. in the case of electrical appliances); in this instance, investments in the trade mark name might possibly confuse consumers, a robust protection of trade marks might thus not only create incentives for economically desirable investments in it, factually reducing the information costs of consumers, but also lead to economically undesirable excessive investments.

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  65. Regulation No. 40/94 of December 20, 1993 on the Community trade mark, OJ L 011 of January 14, 1994, at 1 et seq.

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  66. Also rather cautious, mentioning differentiating examples, Landes & Posner, supra note 4 (2003), at 206 et seq., and by the same authors, supra note 4 (Journal of Law and Economics), at 306 et seq.

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  67. Art. 9 Para. 1 (c) of Regulation No. 40/94 formulates the instances of taking unfair advantage of, on the one hand, and being detrimental to, on the other, the repute of the well-known trade mark as alternative, not, however, as cumulative requirements. Piper, “Zu den Anforderungen an den Schutz der bekannten Gemeinschaftsmarke nach der Gemeinschaftsmarkenverordnung,” 1996 GRUR 657 et seq.; generally with regard to the Community trade mark, see Fezer, “Markenrecht” Intro., note 80 et seq. (3rd ed. 2001), with additional references.

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  68. Supra note 61. For a fundamental treatment as regards this law, see (instead of mentioning all authors) in particular Leistner, “Der Rechtsschutz von Datenbanken im deutschen und europäischen Recht” (2000).

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  69. The scope of this norm has, of course, now been defined more closely by the most recent case law of the ECJ, by stating that the purpose of the protection is only “to promote the establishment of storage and processing systems for existing information” and not “the creation of materials capable of being collected subsequently in a database”; ECJ, November 9, 2004, Case C-203/02, 2005 GRUR Int. 247, 250 — British Horse-Racing (No. 31, referring to one of the parallel cases, ibidem, 242, No. 40); in this regard e.g. Sendrowski, 2005 GRUR 369 et seq.; Derclaye, “Database Sui Generis Right: What is a Substantial investment? A Tentative Definition,” 2005 IIC 2 et seq.; see also the case notes of Leistner, 2005 IIC 592 et seq., Hoeren, 2005 MMR 34 et seq., as well as Lehmann, 2005 CR 15 et seq.

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  70. Cf. also Recital 7 of the Directive: “Whereas the making of databases requires the investment of considerable human, technical and financial resources while such databases can be copied or accessed at a fraction of the cost needed to design them independently”. See also in this regard Lehmann, “The European Database Directive and Its Implementation into German Law,” 1998 IIC 782, related to the motives concerning the legal protection of investments in Recitals 39 and 40. Then, generally with regard to the competition law context of the protection of databases, see also e.g. Leistner, in: Bettinger & Leistner (eds.), “Werbung und Vertrieb im Internet” Part 1 B. N 57 et seq. (2003); Thum, in: Wandtke & Bullinger (eds.), “Urheberrecht”, before Sec. 87(a), note 29 et seq. (2nd ed. 2006); Vogel, in: Schricker (ed.), “Urheberrecht, Kommentar” before German Copyright Law 87(a) et seq. N 36 (2nd ed. 1999); Weber, supra note 8, at 589 et seq.; Wiebe, in: Wiebe & Leupold (eds.), “Recht der elektronischen Datenbanken” Part 2 C. I. N 2 et seq. (as of May 2004).

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  71. Cf. in this regard first evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases of December 12, 2005, available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf> (as of May 2006). For a comparative legal perspective (instead of mentioning all authors), see Hasan, “Sweating in Europe: The European Database Directive,” 2005 Computer Law Review and Technology Journal 479 et seq. (in particular in comparison to the decision of the Supreme Court, 499 U.S. 340 et seq. (1991) — Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.

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  72. With regard to this so-called asymmetry of market conditions supra note 58.

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  73. See e.g. Wiebe, in: Wiebe & Leupold (eds.), supra note 82, at Part 2 C. I. N 6.

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  74. Supra note 81.

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  75. See in this regard also Kur, Hilty, Geiger & Leistner, “First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases — Comment by the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law,” 2006 IIC 551 et seq.

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  76. Cf. with regard to this laboratory function on the level of national law Hilty, “Entwicklungsperspektiven des Schutzes Geistigen Eigentums in Europa,” in: Behrens (ed.), “Stand und Perspektiven des Schutzes Geistigen Eigentums in Europa” 160; similar Kur, 2004 IIC 5. Related to database law, for example, the “catalogue protection” of Swedish, Danish and Finnish copyright law or the Dutch “Geschriftenbescherming” could, in this sense, have been analysed in detail concerning the economic effects on making available data collections (cf. with regard to these approaches e.g. Gaster, “Der Rechtsschutz von Datenbanken. Kommentar zur Richtlinie 96/9/EG”, Art. 7 N, 447 et seq. and 451 et seq. (Cologne 1999)).

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  77. In detail e.g. Krüger, in: Schricker (ed.), “Urheberrecht, Kommentar” Copyright Law before Sec. 73 et seq. N 4 (performers) (2nd ed. 1999); Vogel, ibidem, Copyright Law 81 N 3 (organisers) and Copyright Law 85 N 2 (producers of phonograms); Vogel & v. Ungern-Sternberg, ibidem, Copyright Law 87 N 3 (broadcasting organisations); Katzenberger, ibidem, Copyright Law 94 N 4 (film producers). With regard to references to competition law generally also Vogel, ibidem, Copyright Law 85 N 10; Sambuc, in: Harte & Henning (eds.), supra note 1, at Intro. F, note 225.

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  78. In more depth Hilty, “Gedanken zum Schutze der nachbarrechtlichen Leistung — einst, heute und morgen,” 116 UFITA 35 et seq. (1991); by the same author, “Zum urheberrechtlichen Leistungsschutz im schweizerischen Recht am Beispiel des Tonträgerproduzenten,” 1993 GRUR Int. 818 et seq.; Sambuc, in: Harte & Henning (eds), supra note 1, at Intro. F, note 214; Weber, “Datenbankrecht — Regelungsbedarf in der Schweiz?,” in: Weber & Hilty (eds.), “Daten und Datenbanken” 59 and 66 et seq. (Zurich 1999).

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  79. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 123 S.Ct. 769 (2003).

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  80. See in this regard McCreevy, “EU-Kommissar für Binnenmarkt und Dienstleistungen, IP Policy in Europe: What Next?,” 2006 GRUR Int. 363 (“We will also be looking into the difference in the length of protection given to record producers. In the USA the recording industry enjoys protection lasting 95 years, but in the EU 50 years. We are looking at whether this shorter protection is putting our music business at an economic disadvantage.”). In fact, the US American concept of protecting the producer via copyright law and the European approach of granting a related right are comparable to a limited extent only; however, the European industry obviously does not face a disadvantage since its protection in the US is identical to the protection of the home industry, while the latter enjoys equal protection in Europe compared to the European industry.

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  81. See also in this regard in particular Ullrich, in: Schricker, Dreier & Kur (eds.), supra note 59, at 115 et seq., with the example of the term of protection in copyright law of 70 years p.m.a. for software. It should be added that the problem addressed by McCreevy, referred to in the above footnote, is already as such not conclusive: The US American as well as the European music industry enjoy identical protection in Europe — therefore, one does not deal with the issue of the own industry being disadvantaged in the own market, but at the most with that whether the general public has an interest in protection being extended. This would (only) be the case where due to a lack of adequate protection recordings which would otherwise be made are not, in fact, produced.

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  82. A regulation which, in a certain sense, is similar, but which cannot really serve as an example, as the requirements of protection are not the same, is known in British law in which there also exists an “unregistered design”: Part III of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988; see in this regard Cornish & Llewellyn, “Intellectual Property” notes 14–37 et seq. (5th ed. 2003), and Cornish, “Die Zukunft des Designschutzes in Europa aus der Sicht des britischen Rechts,” 1998 GRUR Int. 368.

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  83. Recital 31 and Art. 96; see also Kur, “Ansätze zur Harmonisierung des Lauterkeitsrechts im Bereich des wettbewerblichen Leistungsschutzes,” 1998 GRUR Int. 780. This fact is not entirely trivial because in this way this restriction of the term of protection in terms of Community law to three years may, by taking “a detour” via national law — in particular in the form of instruments of competition law affording protection against imitations — again, should the occasion arise, (although not uniform in the internal market) be cancelled; cf. in this regard now BGH, September 9, 2005, I ZR 151/02, 2006 GRUR Int. 334 et seq. — Jeans and further infra note 114.

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  84. For an overview in this regard, see Brem, “Der ergänzende wettbewerbsrechtliche Leistungsschutz in Europa” in particular 342 et seq. (related to Germany, Switzerland, France, Spain and Italy) (2005).

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  85. The legal figure of “parasitisme” has recently — despite criticism by legal commentators — been affirmed by the judgement of the French Supreme Court of January 30, 2001, Bull. Civ. IV No. 27. See in this regard also the note by Großerichter & Rageade, 2002 RIW 871 et seq. The principle of “concurrence parasitaire” has been introduced by Saint-Gal, “Concurrence déloyale et concurrence parasitaire (ou agissements parasitaires)” No 25/26 RIPIA 19 et seq. (1956); see generally further e.g. Burst, “Concurrence déloyale et parasitisme” in particular 97 et seq. (1993); Passa, “Contrefaçon et concurrence déloyale” in particular 126 et seq. (1997); Le Tourneau, “Le Parasitisme” (1998); also in German-language literature the discussions by BREM, supra note 103, at 293 et seq., in particular 303 et seq.; Kraßer, “Frankreich,” in: Ulmer (ed.), “Das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft” 244 et seq. (1967); Buydens, “Produktpiraterie und unlauterer Wettbewerb — Die Situation in Belgien und Frankreich mit Hinweisen auf die Rechtslage in Deutschland,” 1995 GRUR Int. 15 et seq.; Schmidt-Szalewski, “Der Unterschied zwischen der Klage wegen Verletzung gewerblicher Schutzrechte und der Wettbewerbsklage in der französischen Rechtsprechung,” 1997 GRUR Int. 1 et seq.

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  86. The point of departure for this approach to protection was the “Record Decision” (“Schallplatten-Entscheidung”) of the Supreme Court of the German Reich of April 7, 1910 (RGZ 73, 294), and — as is still the case in France today — it was based on the delictual provision of Sec. 826 BGB; generally with regard to the “wettbewerbsrechtlicher Leistungsschutz” (“protection of achievement under competition law”), see e.g. Beater, “Nachahmen im Wettbewerb” (1995); Sambuc, supra note 1; Schulte-Beckhausen, “Das Verhältnis des § 1 UWG zu den gewerblichen Schutzrechten und zum Urheberrecht” (1994); Walch, “Ergänzender Leistungsschutz nach § 1 UWG” (1992); Weihrauch, “Der unmittelbare Leistungsschutz im UWG” (2001); see also Fezer, “Leistungsschutz im Wettbewerbsrecht,” 1993 WRP 138 et seq.; Von Gamm, “Die sklavische Nachahmung,” 1973 GRUR 453 et seq.; Hubmann, “Die sklavische Nachahmung,” 1975 GRUR 230 et seq.; Köhler, “Der ergänzende Leistungsschutz: Plädoyer für eine gesetzliche Regelung,” 1999 WRP 1075 et seq.; Krüger, “Der Schutz kurzlebiger Produkte gegen Nachahmungen (Nichttechnischer Bereich),” 1986 GRUR 115 et seq.; Kur, 1990 GRUR 1 et seq.; ibidem, 1998 GRUR Int. 771 et seq.; Müller-Laube, “Wettbewerbsrechtlicher Schutz gegen Nachahmung und Nachbildung gewerblicher Erzeugnisse,” 1992 ZHR 480 et seq.; Tilmann, “Der wettbewerbsrechtliche Schutz vor Nachahmungen,” 1987 GRUR 865 et seq. See most recently also Wiebe, “Unmittelbare Leistungsübernahme im neuen Wettbewerbsrecht,” in: Ohly et al. (eds.), “FS Schricker” 773 et seq. (2005); Riesenhuber, “Lego — Stein des Anstoßes,” 2005 WRP 1118 et seq.; Stieper, “Das Verhältnis von Immaterialgüterrechtsschutz und Nachahmungsschutz nach neuem UWG,” 2006 WRP 291 et seq.

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  87. See in this regard — concerning rights related to copyright — Hilty, 1993 GRUR Int. 823 and by the same author, “Die Leistungsschutzrechte im schweizerischen Urheberrechtsgesetz,” 124 UFITA 134 et seq. (1994); Weber, “Schutz von Datenbanken — Ein neues Immaterialgüterrecht?,” 132 UFITA 16 et seq. (1996); by the same author, supra note 8, at 588.

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  88. Supra note 76.

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  89. For a detailed discussion, see particularly Gordon, supra Systemische und fallbezogene Lösungsansätze für Marktversagen bei Immaterialgütern,” in: Ott & Schäfer (eds.), “Ökonomische Analyse der rechtlichen Organisation von Innovationen” 328 et seq. note 2 (1994), 358 et seq., who, following Liebowitz, “Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination,” Vol. 8 Research in Law and Economics 181 et seq. (1986), at 183–188, shows how production incentives decrease as the term of protection is extended, whereas the “deadweight loss” factor increases, the economic goal thus being to maximise the difference between these two values.

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  90. See also Ullrich, in: Schricker, Dreier & Kur (eds.), supra note 8, 115 et seq.; generally with regard to the different approaches to justifying the terms of protection in copyright law, see Ricketson, “The Term,” 1992 IIC 753 et seq.

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  91. This restriction of the term of protection would, of course, be factually abolished or overcome where, on the basis of “the exemption” of approaches to protection of individual states in Art. 96 Community Regulation on Designs, complementary national protective rights were to be available. Legal commentators thus rightly refer to the fact that the three-year protection period is “the expression of a conscious graduation in relation to the protection of the registered design”, seeing that the unregistered design, because of its lack of publicity, burdens commerce more significantly than a registered right: See Ohly, 2004 ZEuP 312 et seq., who consistently rejects the subsequent application of the “ergänzender Leistungsschutz” (supplementary protection of achievement) in terms of German law; for a more open interpretation of Art. 96 (which, in its conclusions, is similarly critical, however), see Kur, 1998 GRUR Int. 780; the contrary view, it appears, is held (also with regard to German law) by Osterrieth, in: Keller et al. (eds.), “FS Tilmann” 235 et seq. (2003). This notwithstanding, the German Supreme Court, September 9, 2005, I ZR 151/02, 2006 GRUR Int. 334 et seq. — Jeans now expressly holds that a claim based on the “ergänzender Leistungsschutz” on the grounds of an avoidable deception as to origin pursuant to Secs. 3 and 4, No. 9 (a) UWG is not excluded by reason of the fact that the claimants could have relied on the protection afforded unregistered designs for the jeans model manufactured and distributed by them: “The time-limited protection for an unregistered Community design accordingly does not affect the a priori not time-limited claim, based on supplementary protection of achievement under competition law on the grounds of an avoidable deception as to origin pursuant to Secs. 3 and 4, No. 9 (a) UWG, Sec. 1 of the former version of the UWG”. See in this regard also Kiehte & Groeschke, “‘Jeans’ — Verteidigung wettbewerblicher Eigenart von Modeneuheiten,” 2006 WRP 794 et seq.; Ortner, “Zum gewerblichen Rechtsschutz bei Nachahmung von Modeerzeugnissen,” 2006 WRP 189 et seq.

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  92. With regard to the particularities of trade mark law, see also e.g. Heinemann, supra note 8, at 19.

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  93. Cf. with regard to the functions of trade mark protection e.g. Lehmann, “Die wettbewerbswidrige Ausnutzung und Beeinträchtigung des guten Rufs bekannter Marken, Namen und Herkunftsangaben,” 1986 GRUR Int. 14 et seq.; Henning-Bodewig & Kur, “Marke und Verbraucher” 23, Vol. I (1988); Kur, “Funktionswandel von Schutzrechten,” in: Schricker, Dreier & Kur (eds.), supra note 8, at 25 et seq.

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  94. Most recently in detail Jänich, “Geistiges Eigentum — eine Komplementärerscheinung zum Sacheingentum?” (2002); Götting, “Der Begriff des Geistigen Eigentums,” 2006 GRUR 353 et seq.

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  95. For a similar assessment related to copyright law, see Ganea, “Der Stellenwert des Urheberrechts in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften,” in: Ganea et al. (eds.), “Festschrift für Adolf Dietz zum 65. Geburtstag” 43 et seq. (2001); Gordon, supra note 2 (1991–1992), at 857 et seq.; Weber, supra note 8, at 593 et seq.; as well as with regard to “intellectual property” as a whole, Ghidini, “Intellectual Property and Competition Law. The Innovation Nexus” 9 et seq. (2006).

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  96. Cf. Weber, supra Dritte Spur zwischen absoluten und relativen Rechten?,” in: Honsell et al. (eds.), “Aktuelle Aspekte des Schuld-und Sachenrechts, FS Heinz Rey” 591 et seq. (Zurich 2003) note 8, at 583 et seq., in particular 591 et seq. (“third track” [“dritte Spur”]).

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  1. Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, Munich

    Reto M. Hilty (Prof. Dr. iur., Director and Professor)

  2. University of Zurich, Zurich

    Reto M. Hilty (Prof. Dr. iur., Director and Professor)

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    Reto M. Hilty  & Frauke Henning-Bodewig  & 

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Hilty, R.M. (2007). The Law Against Unfair Competition and Its Interfaces. In: Hilty, R.M., Henning-Bodewig, F. (eds) Law Against Unfair Competition. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, vol 1. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71882-6_1

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