Abstract
In a dynamic setting, the players can communicate through operational actions as well as informational actions, attributing a strategic aspect to the exchange of information. The receiver may be worse off after receiving a (true) piece of information from outside sources and is only guaranteed an improvement under specific circumstances. The sender may be better off keeping his private information to himself, and therefore preventing the communication and homogenization of information among the players. Besides, in order to face uncertainty and limited reasoning, the players exploit the time sequentiality of a game by jointly following more or less sophisticated learning processes.
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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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(2008). Learning processes among players. In: Cognitive Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71347-0_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71347-0_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-71346-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-71347-0
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