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Abstract

Chapters 3 and 4 dealt with the primary organs of German public corporations, namely the general meeting, the management board and the supervisory board. Since the German two-tier board system is founded on the management board and the supervisory board, most attention was devoted to these two organs. In this chapter the primary focus is on the German system of supervisory codetermination by employees, and so, again primarily on the supervisory board as it is on the supervisory board that employee representatives serve. This is such an important aspect that it deserves separate chapters. Discussion includes the historical development of codetermination in Germany, its application in various industries and corporations, and the role of trade unions. In Chapter 6 we examine some recent developments and recent perceptions of codetermination in Germany and the European Union. It could be said that in the European context codetermination is at the crossroads because of some fundamental decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Further, the German rules on codetermination are under serious threat of being eroded by some European Community legislation.

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References

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  76. A spectacular example of such conflict came about when Frank Bsirske, chairman of the powerful Trade Union VERDI (Vereinigte Dienstleistungen) that volectively represents the employees working in all kinds of financial institutions; of healthservices; educational institutions; public services; media; telecommunication; and traffic, in summer 2003 called up its members for a strike against the Lufthansa AG on whose supervisory board Bsirske himself was sitting as an employee representative! Cf Gregor Bender, ‘Auch Gewerkschafter im Aufsichtsrat müssen Kodex befolgen’ FAZ 9 July 2003, 17; Anonymous, ‘Wer einen Streik organisiert, gehört nicht in den Aufsichtsrat’ FAZ 27 March 2003; Christian Geinitz, ‘Possenspiel im Osten’ FAZ 12 June 2003, 13.

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  81. A particularly ‘bitter’ poison pill is now contained in S 33(1) sentence 2 third alternative of the Wertpapier-Übernahme-Gesetz (Act on Take-overs) of 20 Dec 2001, which entered into effect on 1 Jan 2002 but was repealed in July 2006. It allowed the board of directors of a company that was the target of a hostile take-over to take measures with the approval of the supervisory board to frustrate the take-over. This could provoke the formation of a calamitous alliance between the board of directors and a codetermined supervisory board which acted to the detriment of the shareholders. The provision also gave rise to doubts to its compatibility with the fundamental rights catalogue of the German Federal Constitution (guarantee of the protection of property). For further details see Michael Kort in Klaus J Hopt and Herbert Wiedemann (eds) Großkommentar zum HGB (4th edn issue 19 Berlin 2003) section 76 para 95.

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  83. Ferdinand Piëch. As to his personality see below n 145.

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  84. ‘Germany’s ‘cowboy capitalism’ Wall Street Journal 9 Aug 2005, A8.

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  86. Expression used by Schiessl Leitungs-und Kontrollstrukturen im internationalen Wettbewerb—Dualistisches System und Mitbestimmung auf dem Prüfstand’ (2003) 167 ZHR (n 88) 237.

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  87. Expression used by Theodor Baums, a renowned German company law academic, according to a note in FAZ 27 June 2003.

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  88. See in particular Ulmer Editorial: Paritätische Arbeitnehmermitbestimmung im Aufsichtsrat von Großunternehmen—noch zeitgemäß?’ (2002) 166 ZHR (n 73) 272; and Klaus J Hopt, ‘Unternehmensführung, Unternehmenskontrolle, Modernisierung des Aktienrechts—Zum Bericht der Regierungskommission Corporate Governance’ in Corporate Governace: Gemeinschaftssymposion der Zeitschriften (ZHR/ZGR) (Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft GmbH, Heidelberg 2002) 42–46, 66–67. The need for a basic reform has also been stressed by Abbo Junker, ‘Unternehmensmitbestimmung in Deutschland-Anpassungsbedarf durch internationale und europäische Entwicklungen’ (2005) 36 ZfA 1–44 (expert opinion prepared for the German Federal Association of Employers).

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  89. This part is also based on the paper delivered by Otto Sandrock in Taipeh in March 2006 (see n 108).

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  100. It was Peter Hartz, whose name is connected with important federal legislation, who reformed the German labour markets and who is well known in the German public. Peter Hartz was the so-called ‘Arbeitsdirektor’ of the Volkswagen AG.

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  107. That covenant was heavily criticised in public; see, for example, FAZ 27 Nov 2006, 11.

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  112. He is a grandson of the legendary designer of the Volkswagen ‘beatle’, Ferdinand Porsche, who was the founder of the famous car-making company. As to his personality see ‘Face value—Volkswagen’s Ferdinand Piëch is fanatical about cars and ruthless towards people’ The Economist 2 Dec 2006, 72.

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  118. See S 4(3), 13(1) Codetermination Act for the Mining, Iron and Steel Industry 1951; Ss 26, 33(1) general Codetermination Act 1976; S 9 One Third Participation Act 2004.

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  119. A resolution of the Federal Committee (Bundesausschuß) of the Federation of the German Trade Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) passed on 10 Oct 2000 for the years 2001 and after regulates the ‘Transfer of Remunerations resulting from Activities in Codetermination or similar Activities’ (Abführung von Vergütungen aus der Wahrnehmung von Mitbestimmungsfunktionen oder ähnlichen Aufgaben). A copy of that resolution has been forwarded to the author of this article by the Hans Böckler-Stiftung.

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  120. The so-called ‘Eigenbehalt’.

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  124. See also the Editorial by Wolfgang Bernhardt, ‘Mitbestimmung zwischen Juristentag und Biedenkopf-Kommission’ (2006) 51/52 BB DIE ERSTE SEITE and his comments, BB-Forum: Unternehmensmitbestimmung nach Biedenkopf’, (2007) BB 381 et seq.

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  125. The paper comprises 116 pages and is published in Deutscher Juristentag (ed) Verhanldungen des 66. Deutschen Juristentages Stuttghart 2006, vol I Gutachten, Munich 2006, pp.B1–B116.

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  126. See Heinz Seidel, ‘Um die Ausweitung der qualifizierten Mitbestimmung (I)’ [1966] Das Mitbestimmungsgespräch 95.

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  127. Art 33(1) and (2) MitbestG and Art 13(1) Montan-MitbesG.

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  128. Immenga Zuständigkeiten des mitbestimmten Aufsichtsrats’ (1977) 6 ZGR (n 77) 258.

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  129. Uwe Hüffer in Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (5th edn Verlag CH Beck, Munich 2002) 376.

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  130. See also Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) (1979) 32 NJW 699, 711.

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  131. See in particular Immenga Zuständigkeiten des mitbestimmten Aufsichtsrats’ (1977) 6 ZGR (n 77) 257–58.

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  132. Kübler (n 4) 406.

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  133. Ibid.

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  134. Cf Immenga Zuständigkeiten des mitbestimmten Aufsichtsrats’ (1977) 6 ZGR (n 77) 257–58; Kübler (n 4) 406.

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  135. BVerfG (1979) 32 NJW 699, 711. See also Peter Hanau, ‘Die arbeitsrechtliche Bedeutung des Mitbestimmungsurteils des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’ (1979) 8 ZGR 545–46.

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  136. Tom Hadden Company Law and Capitalism (2nd edn Weidenfield and Nicolson, London 1977) 450.

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  137. See s 28(1) Erste Wahlordnung zum Mitbestimmungsgesetz (1. WOMitbestG v. 27. Mai 2002 (BGBI. I S. 1682)).

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  138. Press Release 15 May 2002 ‘Wahl von Arbeitnehmervertretern in Aufsichtsräte wird einfacher’ <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Nachrichten/-,433/Pressemitteilungen.htm>.

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  139. For academic purposes the Germans distinguish between collective bargaining (Tarifvertrag); codetermination in the enterprise (Mitbestimmung im Unternehmen); and codetermination at shop-floor level or in business (Mitbestimmung im Betrieb)-see Hanau Die arbeitsrechtliche Bedeutung des Mitbestimmungsurteils des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’ (1979) 8 ZGR (n 179) 540. Another distinction which is sometimes made is between workplace codetermination (betrieblichen Mitbestimmung) and enterprise or corporate codetermination (unternehmerische Mitbestimmung)-Loritz (n 4) 3; Eisenhardt (n 8) 307. The different forms of codetermination are, however, also linked to each other-Hanau (n 179) 541. See also Hanau (n 14) VII.

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  140. See especially Heinz Seidel ‘Um die Ausweitung der qualifizierten Mitbestimmung (II)’ [1966] Das Mitbestimmungsgespräch 115–16. 188 Aktienrechtsreform und Mitbestimmung-Stellungnahmen und Vorschläge, Bundesvorstand des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes (1962). See Seidel (n 169) 95 (fn 3).

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  141. At first, corporations were classified as large public corporations if they complied with any two of three stated requirements, namely employing more than 2000 employees, with a balance sheet sum of more than DM 50 million, and with a turrnover of DM 100 million-see Seidel Um die Ausweitung der qualifizierten Mitbestimmung (II)’ [1966] Das Mitbestimmungsgespräch 115–16 (n 187) 95–96. After some further deliberation, these requirements were eventually fixed in 1966 at 2000 people employed, a balance sheet sum of more than DM 75 million, and a yearly turrnover of DM 150 million.

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  142. Seidel Um die Ausweitung der qualifizierten Mitbestimmung (I)’ [1966] Das Mitbestimmungsgespräch 95 (n 169) 96.

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  143. Seidel Um die Ausweitung der qualifizierten Mitbestimmung (II)’ [1966] Das Mitbestimmungsgespräch 115–16 (n 187) 116–17.

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  144. Raiser (n 4) 122 (fn 54).

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du Plessis, J., Sandrock, O. (2007). The German System of Supervisory Codetermination by Employees. In: German Corporate Governance in International and European Context. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71187-2_5

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