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On the Impact of Social Network Profiling on Anonymity

  • Claudia Diaz
  • Carmela Troncoso
  • Andrei Serjantov
Conference paper
  • 1.2k Downloads
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5134)

Abstract

This paper studies anonymity in a setting where individuals who communicate with each other over an anonymous channel are also members of a social network. In this setting the social network graph is known to the attacker. We propose a Bayesian method to combine multiple available sources of information and obtain an overall measure of anonymity. We study the effects of network size and find that in this case anonymity degrades when the network grows. We also consider adversaries with incomplete or erroneous information; characterize their knowledge of the social network by its quantity, quality and depth; and discuss the implications of these properties for anonymity.

Keywords

Social Network Small World Network Noisy Version Anonymous Communication Social Network Graph 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Claudia Diaz
    • 1
  • Carmela Troncoso
    • 1
  • Andrei Serjantov
    • 2
  1. 1.K.U. Leuven ESAT-COSICLeuven-HeverleeBelgium
  2. 2.The Free Haven Project 

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