Abstract

A logic of action is essential for many treatments of normative concerns, but most treatments either ignore the role of agents, as in PDL, or omit all possibility of naming actions, as in various versions of stit theory. Moreover, most treatments of either type do not attempt to provide an account of what actions are, in a way that would distinguish actions from other processes or events. In this paper, I explore an account of actions as a species of events, with events interpreted against a background of the logic of branching time. This opens a new approach to exploring the relations between logics of personal action (e.g. Belnap’s and Horty’s stit theories) and impersonal logics of actions such as PDL, and offers some prospect of a deontic logic which integrates tunsollen (ought to do) into a system of seinsollen (ought to be).

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Belnap Jr., N.D.: Backwards and Forwards in the Modal Logic of Agency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51, 777–807 (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Belnap Jr., N.D.: Before Refraining: Concepts for Agency. Erkenntnis 34, 137–169 (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Belnap Jr., N.D., Perloff, M., Xu, M.: Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterminist World. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Brown, M.A.: Acting with an End in Sight. In: Goble, L., Meyer, J.-J.C. (eds.) DEON 2006. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 4048, pp. 69–84. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Brown, M.A.: Acts and Actions. Presented at the Society for Exact Philosophy (May 2008)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Dignum, F., Meyer, J.-J.C., Wieringa, R.J., Kuiper, R.: A Modal Approach to Intentions, Commitments and Obligations: Intention plus Commitment Yields Obligation. In: Brown, M.A., Carmo, J. (eds.) Deontic Logic, Agency and Normative Systems (DEON 1996), pp. 80–97. Springer, Berlin (1996)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Grossi, D., Dignum, F., Royakkers, L.M., Meyer, J.-J.C.: Collective obligations and agency: Who gets the blame? In: Lomuscio, A., Nute, D. (eds.) DEON 2004. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 3065, pp. 129–145. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Horty, J.F.: Agency and Deontic Logic. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001)MATHGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Horty, J.F., Belnap Jr., N.D.: The deliberative Stit: A Study of Action, Omission, Ability, and Obligation. J. Phil. Logic 24, 583–644 (1995)MATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Meyer, J.-J.Ch.: A Different Approach to Deontic Logic: Deontic Logic Viewed as a Variant of Dynamic Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 29.1, 109–136 (1988)MATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Pörn, I.: Some Basic Concepts of Action. In: Stedlund, S. (ed.) Logical Theory and Semantic Analysis. D. Reidel, Dordrecht (1977)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Thomason, R.H.: Deontic Logic and the Role of Freedom in Moral Deliberation. In: Hilpinen, R. (ed.) New Studies in Deontic Logic (Synthese Library), vol. 152, pp. 177–186. D. Reidel, Dordrecht (1981)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Xu, M.: Causation in Branching Time (I): Transitions, Events, and Causes. Synthese 112, 137–192 (1997)MATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark A. Brown
    • 1
  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentSyracuse UniversitySyracuseUSA

Personalised recommendations