A Deontic Logic for Socially Optimal Norms

  • Jan Broersen
  • Rosja Mastop
  • John-Jules Ch. Meyer
  • Paolo Turrini
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-70525-3_17

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5076)
Cite this paper as:
Broersen J., Mastop R., Meyer JJ.C., Turrini P. (2008) A Deontic Logic for Socially Optimal Norms. In: van der Meyden R., van der Torre L. (eds) Deontic Logic in Computer Science. DEON 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5076. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

The paper discusses the interaction properties between preference and choice of coalitions in a strategic interaction. A language is presented to talk about the conflict between coalitionally optimal and socially optimal choices. Norms are seen as social constructions that enable to enforce socially desirable outcomes.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jan Broersen
    • 1
  • Rosja Mastop
    • 1
  • John-Jules Ch. Meyer
    • 1
  • Paolo Turrini
    • 1
  1. 1.Universiteit Utrecht 

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