Normative Consequence: The Problem of Keeping It Whilst Giving It up
The problem of deriving implicit norms from explicitly given ones is at the heart of normative reasoning. In abstracto the problem is that of formalizing a plausible consequence relation taking norms to norms. I argue that any such relation should allow norms to be chained, even when the consequent of one is strictly stronger than the antecedent of another—i. e. even if logical inference is required to complete the chain. However, since it is commonly agreed that the set of items classically entailed by an obligatory proposition are not in general obligatory, we are left with the following problem: How do reserve the right to reason classically for the purpose of chaining, whilst not committing to the view that all items entailed by a norm are obligatory in the same sense. I shall argue that the problem can be given a natural solution with reference to different uses of a norm in a normative system.
KeywordsNormative systems input/output logic dynamics
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