Abstract
Game theory in general and the concept of Nash equilibrium in particular have lately come under increased scrutiny by theoretical computer scientists. Computing a mixed Nash equilibrium is a case in point. For many years, one of the most important open problems was the complexity of computing a mixed Nash equilibrium in games with only two players. Only recently was it solved by a sequence of significant papers (Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2006), Daskalakis et.al. (2006), Chen and Deng (2005), Daskalakis and Papadimitriou (2005), and Chen and Deng (2006)).
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Dunke, J. (2007). Complexity of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Games. In: Waldmann, KH., Stocker, U.M. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 2006. Operations Research Proceedings, vol 2006. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69995-8_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69995-8_7
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