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Handbook of New Institutional Economics pp 611–638Cite as

Institutions and Development

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Developed countries are the exception, not the rule. Billions of dollars of aid and countless hours of advice notwithstanding, most countries have not been able to foster sustained growth and social progress. Increasingly research has shown that weak, missing or perverse institutions are the roots of underdevelopment. Other explanations for development, such as investment, technological innovation, or years of schooling are not correlated with higher rates of economic growth (Easterly 2002). Instead, cross-country regressions persistently demonstrate large and statistically significant correlations between institutional variables and growth, and in horse races between variables, an index of institutional quality “trumps” geography or trade as an explanation for growth (Rodrik, et al. 2002).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Ronald Coase Institute, 5610 Wisconsin Ave, 20815, Chevy Chase, MD, USA

    Mary M. Shirley

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  1. Mary M. Shirley
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Université de Paris, 106 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75647, Paris, France

    Claude Ménard

  2. The Ronald Coase Institute, 5610 Wisconsin Ave, 20815, Chevy Chase, MD, USA

    Mary M. Shirley

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Shirley, M.M. (2008). Institutions and Development. In: Ménard, C., Shirley, M.M. (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69305-5_25

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