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A New Institutional Approach to Organization

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Modern economic theory has long neglected, even ignored, the analysis of the different modes of organization that characterize a market economy. Notwithstanding the efforts of Alfred Marshall, one of its founding fathers, in identifying the properties of “business organizations” (1920, Book IV, chap. 10 sq.), standard microeconomics relied for decades on the concept of firms as production functions, an umbrella to the technologically determined combination of inputs.

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  1. Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Université de Paris, 106 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75647, Paris, France

    Claude Ménard

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  1. Université de Paris, 106 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75647, Paris, France

    Claude Ménard

  2. The Ronald Coase Institute, 5610 Wisconsin Ave, 20815, Chevy Chase, MD, USA

    Mary M. Shirley

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Ménard, C. (2008). A New Institutional Approach to Organization. In: Ménard, C., Shirley, M.M. (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69305-5_13

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