In this chapter we go somewhat deeper into evolutionary game theory. The concepts of evolutionary stable strategy and replicator dynamics, introduced in Chap. 8, are further explored, and proofs of results mentioned in that chapter are provided. We advise the reader to study Chap. 8 first, although the present chapter is largely self-contained.
This chapter is based mainly on [147]. In Sect. 15.1 we briefly review symmetric two-player games. Section 15.2 discusses evolutionary stable strategies and Sect. 15.3 replicator dynamics.
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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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(2008). Evolutionary Games. In: Game Theory. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69291-1_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69291-1_15
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