Abstract
This study focuses on the effect of inter-group competition in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Recent experimental studies have investigated inter-group competitions in which matched teams compete against each other to produce larger contributions (cooperation within one’s group). Bornstein et al. and Goren (Bornstein [3], Bornstein and Ben-Yossef [2], Bornstein, Erev and Goren [3], Goren [6], Goren and Bornstein [6]) investigate the inter-group competition of a special prisoner’s dilemma. Features of their game fit the examples of lobbying, wars, and similar forms of competition: 1) no contribution is a dominant strategy for all players in the game, 2) no contribution is the collectively (i.e., Pareto) efficient outcome of the game. The studies also show that competition has a positive effect on the cooperative decision, but that the effect does not last when the game is repeated.
This research was supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), Grant-in-Aid for (B) No. 15730145 and the Open Research Center “Experimental Economics: A New Method of Teaching Economics and the Research on Its Impact on Society”, Kyoto Sangyo University
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Iida, Y. (2007). The Effect of Inter-group Competition in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. In: Oda, S.H. (eds) Developments on Experimental Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 590. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68660-6_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68660-6_13
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