Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Diplomacy Games pp 25–44Cite as

Game Models of Peace and War: Some Recent Themes

  • Chapter

Abstract

In 1994 I surveyed game models of peace and war for the Handbook of Game Theory: this review summarizes some of the developments since that time. When the Cold War ended, concern over nuclear war yielded to broader issues, such as ethnic conflict, humanitarian intervention, nuclear proliferation, sanctions as tools of compellance, the establishment of stable democracies in new nations, globalization and trade, and the formation of supranational bodies. Current game theory applications on war and peace responded to these political changes, so that the variety of topics the field now treats has made it especially interesting. More than before, the literature can be seen as analyses of different kinds of international bargaining.

The author would like to thank Kathy Bawn, Jeff Lewis, Barbara Koremenos, Ken Schultz, and Alex Wendt for their suggestions, and the Russell Sage Foundation for its support.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Alesina A, Spolaore E (2003) The size of nations. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Google Scholar 

  2. Baliga S, Sjöström T (2004) Arms races and negotiations. Review of Economic Studies 71:351–369

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Bueno de Mesquita B, Lalman D (1992) War and reason. Review of Economic Studies 71:351–369

    Google Scholar 

  4. Bueno de Mesquita B, Morrow J, Siverson R, Smith A (1999) An institutional theory of the democratic peace. American Political Science Review 93:791–808

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Bueno de Mesquita E (2005a) Conciliation, counterterrorism, and patterns of terrorist violence. International Organization 59:145–76

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Bueno de Mesquita E (2005b) The quality of terror. American Journal of Political Science 49:515–530

    Google Scholar 

  7. Carlsson H, van Damme E (1993) Global games and equilibrium selection. Econometrica 61:989–1018

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Cohen D, Nisbett R (1996) Culture of honor: the psychology of violence in the south. Westview, Boulder, CO, USA

    Google Scholar 

  9. Enders W, Sandler T (2002) What do we know about the substitution effect in transnational terrorism? In: Andrew S, Ilardi G (eds) Research on terrorism: trends, achievements, failures. Routledge, New York, USA

    Google Scholar 

  10. Eisner R (1968) War and peace: a new view of the game. Department of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA

    Google Scholar 

  11. Favretto K (2004) Does impartiality matter? Bias and coercion in major power mediation. Working paper, Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, USA

    Google Scholar 

  12. Fearon J (1994a) Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review 88:577–92

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Fearon J (1994b) Signaling versus the balance of power and interest: an empirical test of a crisis bargaining model. Journal of Conflict Resolution 38:236–69

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Fearon J (1995) Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49:379–414

    Google Scholar 

  15. Fearon J (1997) Signaling foreign policy interests: tying hands versus sinking costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41:68–90

    Article  Google Scholar 

  16. Fearon J (1998) Bargaining, enforcement and international cooperation. International Organization 52:269–305

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Fearon J, Laitin D (1996) Explaining interethnic cooperation. American Political Science Review 90:715–35

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. Fearon J, Wendt A (2002) Rational choice and constructivism: a skeptical view. In: Carlsnaes W, Risse T, Simmons B (eds) Handbook of international relations. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, USA

    Google Scholar 

  19. Felsenthal D, Machover M (2001) Myths and meaning of voting power: comments on a symposium. Journal of Theoretical Politics 18:31–97

    Google Scholar 

  20. Garrett G, Tsebelis G (2001) Even more reasons to resist the temptation of power indices in the EU. Journal of Theoretical Politics 13:99–105

    Article  Google Scholar 

  21. Gilligan M (2004) Is there a broader-deeper trade-off in international multilateral agreements? International Organization 58:459–484

    Google Scholar 

  22. Guisinger A, Smith A (2002) Honest threats: the interaction of reputation and political institutions in international crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46:175–200

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Iida K (1993a) Analytic uncertainty and international cooperation: theory and application to international economic policy coordination. International Studies Quarterly 37:431–57

    Article  Google Scholar 

  24. Iida K (1993b) When and how do domestic constraints matter? Two-level games with uncertainty. Journal of Conflict Resolution 37:403–26

    Article  Google Scholar 

  25. Iida K (1994) Are negotiators hawkish of moderate-negotiator selection in two-level games. Sociological Theory and Methods 9:3–20

    Google Scholar 

  26. Intriligator M, Brito D (1984) A game theory model of the military industrial complex. Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, USA

    Google Scholar 

  27. Jarque X, Ponsati C, Sakovics J (2001) Mediation: incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication. Working paper, Departament d’Economia i Ha, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain

    Google Scholar 

  28. Jervis R (1989) The meaning of the nuclear revolution. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, USA

    Google Scholar 

  29. Kerby W, Göbeler F (1996) The distribution of voting power in the United Nations. In: Huber RK, Avenhaus R (eds) Models for security policy in the post-cold war era. Nomos, Baden-Baden, Germany, 221–30

    Google Scholar 

  30. Koremenos B (2005) Contracting around international uncertainty. American Political Science Review 99:549–565

    Article  Google Scholar 

  31. Kreps D, Wilson R (1982) Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27:253–279

    Article  Google Scholar 

  32. Kurizaki S (2004) Efficient secrecy, public versus private threats in international diplomacy. Working paper, Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, USA

    Google Scholar 

  33. Kydd A (1997) Game theory and the spiral model. World Politics 49:371–400

    Article  Google Scholar 

  34. Kydd A (2000a) Trust, reassurance and cooperation. International Organization 54:325–57

    Article  Google Scholar 

  35. Kydd A (2000b) Arms races and arms control: modeling the hawk perspective. World Politics 44:228–44

    Google Scholar 

  36. Kydd A (2001) Trust building, trust breaking: the dilemma of NATO enlargement. International Organization 55:808–28

    Article  Google Scholar 

  37. Kydd A (2003) Which side are you on? Bias, credibility and mediation. American Journal of Political Science 47:597–611

    Google Scholar 

  38. Kydd A (2005) Trust and mistrust in international relations. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA

    Google Scholar 

  39. Kydd A, Walter B (2002) Sabotaging the peace: the politics of extremist violence. International Organization 56:263–96

    Article  Google Scholar 

  40. Lewis J, Schultz K (2003) Revealing preferences: empirical estimation of a crisis bargaining game with incomplete information. Political Analysis 11:345–67

    Article  Google Scholar 

  41. Liberman P (2002) Honor, arms and war. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, USA, September

    Google Scholar 

  42. Maggi G, Morelli M (2004) Self-enforcing voting in international organizations. Working paper, Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA

    Google Scholar 

  43. Martin L (1992) Coercive cooperation: explaining multilateral economic sanctions. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA

    Google Scholar 

  44. McKelvey R, Palfrey T (1995) Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Games and Economic Behavior 10:6–38

    Article  Google Scholar 

  45. Milner H, Rosendorff P (1997) Interests, institutions, and information. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA

    Google Scholar 

  46. Morris S, Shin HS (2003) Global games: theory and applications. In: Dewatripont M, Hansen L, Turnovsky S, (eds) Advances in economics and econometrics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK

    Google Scholar 

  47. O’Neill B (1994) Game theory models of peace and war. In: Aumann R, Hart S (eds) Handbook of game theory. Elsevier Science Publishers, New York, USA

    Google Scholar 

  48. O’Neill B (1996) Power and satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council. Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:219–37

    Article  Google Scholar 

  49. O’Neill B (1999) Honor symbols and war. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, USA

    Google Scholar 

  50. O’Neill B (2001) Risk aversion in international relations theory. International Studies Quarterly 45:617–40

    Article  Google Scholar 

  51. O’Neill B (2003) Mediating disputes over honor: lessons from the era of dueling. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 159:1–19

    Article  Google Scholar 

  52. O’Neill, B (2004) What can a disinterested, powerless mediator do? American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, USA

    Google Scholar 

  53. O’Neill B (2005) Nuclear weapons and national prestige. Manuscript, University of California, Los Angeles, USA

    Google Scholar 

  54. O’Neill B, Peleg B (2000) Reconciling power and equality in international organization: a voting method from Rabbi Krochmal of Kremsier. Jewish Political Studies Review 12:3–14

    Google Scholar 

  55. Partell P, Palmer G (1999) Audience costs and interstate crises: an empirical assessment of Fearon’s model of dispute outcomes. International Studies Quarterly 43:389–405

    Article  Google Scholar 

  56. Powell R (1990) Nuclear deterrence theory. CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, UK

    Google Scholar 

  57. Powell R (1999) In the shadow of power. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA

    Google Scholar 

  58. Powell R (2002) Bargaining theory and international conflict. Annual Review of Political Science 5:1–30

    Article  Google Scholar 

  59. Powell R (2004) The inefficient use of power: costly conflict with complete information. American Political Science Review 98:231–41

    Article  Google Scholar 

  60. Putnam R (1988) Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International Organization 42:427–60

    Article  Google Scholar 

  61. Rapoport A, Golan E (1985) Assessment of political power in the Israeli Knesset. American Political Science Review 79:673–92

    Article  Google Scholar 

  62. Sandler T, Lapan H (1988) The calculus of dissent: an analysis of terrorists’ choice of targets. Synthese 76:245–61

    Article  Google Scholar 

  63. Sartori A (2002) The might of the pen: a reputational theory of communication in international disputes. International Organization 56:121–49

    Article  Google Scholar 

  64. Schelling T (1984) Confidence in crisis. International Security 8:55–66

    Article  Google Scholar 

  65. Schultz K (1998) Domestic opposition and signaling in international crises. American Political Science Review. 92:829–44

    Article  Google Scholar 

  66. Schultz K (2001a) Democracy and coercive diplomacy. New York, USA, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Google Scholar 

  67. Schultz K (2001b) Looking at audience costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45:32–60

    Article  Google Scholar 

  68. Signorino C (1999) Strategic interaction and the statistical analysis of international con-flict. American Political Science Review 93:279–97

    Article  Google Scholar 

  69. Signorino C (2003) Structure and uncertainty in discrete choice models. Political Analysis 11:316–44

    Article  Google Scholar 

  70. Slantchev B (2003a) The power to hurt: costly conflict with completely informed states. American Political Science Review 97:123–33

    Google Scholar 

  71. Slantchev B (2003b) The principle of convergence in wartime negotiations. American Political Science Review 97:621–32

    Google Scholar 

  72. Smith A (1998) International crises and domestic politics. American Political Science Review 92:623–38

    Article  Google Scholar 

  73. Smith A (1999) Testing theories of strategic choice: the example of crisis escalation. American Journal of Political Science 43:1254–83

    Article  Google Scholar 

  74. Tarar A (2001) International bargaining with two-sided domestic constraints. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45:320–40

    Article  Google Scholar 

  75. Tsebelis G (2002) Veto players: how political institutions work. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA

    Google Scholar 

  76. Voeten E (2001) Outside options and the logic of security council action. American Political Science Review 95:845–58

    Google Scholar 

  77. Wagner H (2000) Bargaining and war. American Journal of Political Science 44:469–84

    Article  Google Scholar 

  78. Walt S (1999) Rigor or rigor mortis? Rational choice and security studies. International Security 23:5–48

    Google Scholar 

  79. Walter B (2006) Information, uncertainty and the decision to secede. International Organization

    Google Scholar 

  80. Wendt A (1999) The social theory of international relations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK

    Google Scholar 

  81. Werner S (1998) Negotiating the terms of settlement: war aims and the bargaining. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42:321–43

    Article  Google Scholar 

  82. Wittman D (1979) How a war ends: a rational model approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution 21:741–61

    Google Scholar 

  83. Wright Q (1942) A study of war. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, USA

    Google Scholar 

  84. Zagare F, Kilgour M (2000) Perfect deterrence. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, USA

    Barry O’Neill

Authors
  1. Barry O’Neill
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of the Federal Armed Forces Munich, Werner-Heisenberg-Weg 39, 85577, Neubiberg, Germany

    Rudolf Avenhaus

  2. School of Advanced International Studies, The John Hopkins University, 1740 Massachusetts Ave., Washington, D.C., 20036, USA

    I. William Zartman

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2007 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

O’Neill, B. (2007). Game Models of Peace and War: Some Recent Themes. In: Avenhaus, R., Zartman, I.W. (eds) Diplomacy Games. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68304-9_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation