Abstract
Public-key encryption schemes are a useful and interesting field of cryptographic study. The ultimate goal for the cryptographer in the field of public-key encryption would be the production of a very efficient encryption scheme with a proof of security in a strong security model using a weak and reasonable computational assumption. This ultimate goal has yet to be reached. In this invited paper, we survey the major results that have been achieved in the quest to find such a scheme.
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Dent, A.W. (2008). A Brief History of Provably-Secure Public-Key Encryption. In: Vaudenay, S. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2008. AFRICACRYPT 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5023. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68164-9_24
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