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Residual Income as a Performance Measure for Switching Options

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Real Options and Investment Incentives

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References

  1. See Margrabe (1978) and Carr (1988) for the valuation of the option to switch in a single-person decision context.

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  2. See Pellens, et al. (1998).

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  3. See, e.g., Ehrbar (1998); Stern et al. (2001); Young & O’Byrne (2001).

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  4. See particularly Rogerson (1997); Reichelstein (1997). See also Baldenius (2002); Dutta & Reichelstein (1999); Dutta & Reichelstein (2002b); Dutta & Reichelstein (2002a); Pfeiffer (2000); Reichelstein (2000); Wagenhofer (2003).

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  5. See, e.g., Young & O’Byrne (2001), pp. 147–158.

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  6. See Rogerson (1997); Reichelstein (1997); Dutta & Reichelstein (2002a).

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  7. For example, Antle et al. (2000) and chapter 3 analyze agency models, where the manager has private information about an investment with an embedded real option. However, they analyze capital budgeting issues and do not consider residual income as a performance measure. Dutta & Reichelstein (2002a) analyze residual income as a performance measure for research and development investments, when the project can be abandoned before it generates cash inflows. Dutta (2003) analyzes residual income as a managerial performance measure, when the manager can invest in a growth opportunity that can also be implemented outside the firm.

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  8. For the first decision, this result follows immediately from proposition 3 in Reichelstein (1997), p. 168. The second decision can be considered as a mutually exclusive investment opportunity, and a derivation of a corresponding result is straightforward for our assumption of identically distributed cash flows.

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  9. See Rogerson (1997).

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  10. This result is the well-known Preinreich-Luecke-Theorem, see Preinreich (1937) and Lücke (1955).

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  11. See Corona (2002) for a detailed analysis of a goal congruent treatment of goodwill in business acquisitions, when residual income is used for managerial performance evaluation.

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  12. See, e.g., Friedl (2000).

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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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(2007). Residual Income as a Performance Measure for Switching Options. In: Real Options and Investment Incentives. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-48268-0_4

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