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References
For an overview see, e.g., Dixit & Pindyck (1994); Trigeorgis (1996).
See, e.g., Lambert (2001) pp. 77–79.
Antle & Eppen (1985) have analyzed the role of organizational slack for a single one-period investment project based on the same hypothesis.
See Antle & Fellingham (1997) for an overview over models with private information and incentives.
The latter of these results can be found in a number of papers dealing with investment incentive problems, including Holmström & Weiss (1985); Harris & Raviv (1996); Bernardo et al. (2001); Dutta & Reichelstein (2002b).
See McDonald & Siegel (1986); Ingersoll jr. & Ross (1992); Hu & Bernt (1998).
See Myers (1977); Kester (1984); Kester (1993).
One exception is Bjerksund & Stensland (2000). They study a situation, where a principal who is the owner of a natural gas field must get gas through a pipeline that is operated by an agent to the market.
For an application of their model see Antle et al. (2001).
In general, the value of the timing option is high, when the investment opportunity is exclusive to one party. Competition reduces the option value. See Grenadier (1996).
See Schiller (2001) for a similar assumption. Laux (2001) shows, how the limited-liability constraint relaxes, if multiple projects are combined under the management of a single manager.
Here, I refer particularly to the result in Antle & Eppen (1985).
See Neher (1999) for an explanation of staged financing in the face of a commitment problem using a model with perfect certainty.
See Amram & Kulatilaka (1999), p. 168.
See Friedl (2002a), pp. 73–81.
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(2007). Capital Rationing as an Incentive Instrument for Growth Options. In: Real Options and Investment Incentives. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-48268-0_3
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