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A Combinatorial Exchange for Autonomous Traders

  • Andreas Tanner
  • Gero Mühl
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2738)

Abstract

Combinatorial exchanges have attracted much attention recently. However, to this point there is no generally accepted payment allocation algorithm capable of clearing combinatorial exchanges. The Vickrey-Groves-Clarke mechanism, which has been successfully applied in the case of one-sided combinatorial auctions, is not budget-balanced when generalized to two-sided auctions. We present a new model for an auction market with autonomous traders and conjunctive combinatorial bids that allows formulation of some fairness properties applicable when pricing is based solely on the buyer’s bids. We then give an example payment allocation algorithm that implements these properties.

Keywords

Combinatorial Exchanges 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andreas Tanner
    • 1
  • Gero Mühl
    • 1
  1. 1.Intelligent Networks and Management of Distributed Systems, Faculty for Electrical Engineering and Computer ScienceBerlin University of TechnologyBerlinGermany

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