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Profiting from Untrusted Parties in Web-Based Applications

  • Claus Boyens
  • Matthias Fischmann
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2738)

Abstract

Privacy Homomorphisms (PHs) are encryption functions that allow for a limited processing of encrypted data. They are of particular importance for the transformation of sensitive data that is given away to untrusted third parties for computation purposes. In this paper, we analyze the theoretical foundations of this class of functions and mark out its limitations in terms of security and functionality. We then propose the employment of PHs in two different usage environments. First, a single user wants an untrusted service provider to perform operations on encrypted data that she lacks the power or ability to compute herself. Second, a group of peers uses the services of a semi-trusted mediator who cannot be relied on in principle but who is assumed not to collude with either of the peers. In both cases, privacy is preserved by encrypting sensitive data with a PH before transferring it to the untrusted party. The results show that PHs can be usefully employed in both situations although their firm theoretical limitations inhibit general-purpose use.

Keywords

Service Provider Encryption Scheme Sensitive Data Online Service Single User 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Claus Boyens
    • 1
  • Matthias Fischmann
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Information SystemsHumboldt University BerlinBerlinGermany

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