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An Anonymous Asymmetric Public Key Traitor Tracing Scheme

  • Eun Young Choi
  • Jung Yeon Hwang
  • Dong Hoon Lee
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2738)

Abstract

In broadcast encryption schemes, traceability is a useful property to trace authorized subscribers, called traitors, who collude for manufacturing a pirate decoder. Unfortunately, this is usually achieved with a sacrifice of a privacy. Most traitor tracing schemes in the literature have been developed without considering a subscriber’s anonymity, which is one of important requirements for electronic marketplaces to offer similar privacy as current marketplace. It would be unsatisfactory for the subscriber to reveal his/her identity to purchase multimedia contents. In this paper we propose an anonymous broadcast encryption scheme, where a user can subscribe anonymously, but anonymity control is provided, i.e., a data supplier can trace traitors. Our scheme is constructed based on an asymmetric public-key traitor tracing scheme with one trustee.

Keywords

Blind Signature Bulletin Board Oblivious Transfer Trust Agent Oblivious Transfer Protocol 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eun Young Choi
    • 1
  • Jung Yeon Hwang
    • 1
  • Dong Hoon Lee
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Information Security Technologies (CIST)Korea UniversitySeoulKorea

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