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Context-Sensitive Equivalences for Non-interference Based Protocol Analysis

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2751))

Abstract

We develop new proof techniques, based on non-interference, for the analysis of safety and liveness properties of cryptographic protocols expressed as terms of the process algebra CryptoSPA. Our approach draws on new notions of behavioral equivalence, built on top of a context-sensitive labelled transition system, that allow us to characterize the behavior of a process in the presence of any attacker with a given initial knowledge. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach with an example of a protocol of fair exchange.

This work has been partially supported by the MIUR project “Modelli formali per la sicurezza (MEFISTO)” and the EU project IST-2001-32617 “Models and types for security in mobile distributed systems (MyThS)”.

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Bugliesi, M., Ceccato, A., Rossi, S. (2003). Context-Sensitive Equivalences for Non-interference Based Protocol Analysis. In: Lingas, A., Nilsson, B.J. (eds) Fundamentals of Computation Theory. FCT 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2751. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45077-1_34

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45077-1_34

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-40543-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45077-1

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