Abstract
In this paper we consider low latency connection-based anonymity systems which can be used for applications like web browsing or SSH. Although several such systems have been designed and built, their anonymity has so far not been adequately evaluated.
We analyse the anonymity of connection-based systems against passive adversaries. We give a precise description of two attacks, evaluate their effectiveness, and calculate the amount of traffic necessary to provide a minimum degree of protection against them.
Keywords
- Interarrival Time
- Outgoing Link
- Threat Model
- Route Length
- Collision Domain
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Serjantov, A., Sewell, P. (2003). Passive Attack Analysis for Connection-Based Anonymity Systems. In: Snekkenes, E., Gollmann, D. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2003. ESORICS 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2808. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-39650-5_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-39650-5_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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