Authenticating Mandatory Access Controls and Preserving Privacy for a High-Assurance Smart Card

  • Helmut Scherzer
  • Ran Canetti
  • Paul A. Karger
  • Hugo Krawczyk
  • Tal Rabin
  • David C. Toll
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2808)

Abstract

This paper presents an authentication protocol for high-assurance smart card operating systems that support download of mutually suspicious applications. Such a protocol is required to be part of the operating system, rather than the traditional smart card approach of allowing applications to do authentication, because strong authentication is essential for the operating system to protect one application from another. The protocol itself is based on the existing IKE protocol [13], used for authentication in IPSEC. What is new is the integration of an IKE-like protocol with authentication of mandatory secrecy and integrity access controls, the recognition that a single PKI-hierarchy cannot certify identity and all possible mandatory access rights, and the use of IKE to resolve privacy problems found in existing smart card authentication protocols.

Keywords

Smart Card Authentication Protocol Card Holder Security Authority Mandatory Access Control 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Helmut Scherzer
    • 1
  • Ran Canetti
    • 2
  • Paul A. Karger
    • 2
  • Hugo Krawczyk
    • 2
    • 3
  • Tal Rabin
    • 2
  • David C. Toll
    • 2
  1. 1.IBM Deutschland GmbHSecure Systems and Smart CardsBöblingenGermany
  2. 2.IBM Research DivisionT. J. Watson Research CenterYorktown HeightsUSA
  3. 3.Department of Electrical EngineeringTechnionHaifaIsrael

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