Abstract
Many scholars of European integration have treated the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a specific area of the EU.1 This is due to the fact that CFSP, and before it the European Political Cooperation (which was a nucleus of CFSP), have remained primarily an intergovernmental framework, although other EC pillars evolved to a much higher supranational degree over the years. For some theorists of European integration it was a clear sign that foreign and security policy would always remain the realm of national governments, which occasionally were willing to coordinate their national interests.2 According to the old dictum of Stanley Hoffmann, this area of state activity belongs to so-called “high politics,” meaning that advanced integration in this field, in the sense of a creation of supranational institutions, will never materialize.3 This train of thought, called neo-realism in the discipline of International Relations, regards foreign policy as a highly controversial area guarded by national governments. This is so because foreign policy is essential to the survival of states and their citizens. It is also claimed that sovereign foreign policy is crucial for democracy, since civil and political rights can only be safeguarded by nation-states. Thus, national governments regard the issues of foreign and security policy in terms of relative gains, that is, states define the utility of political decisions with regard to gains of other states (other states should not be allowed to gain more from cooperative arrangements than oneself because they may abuse their lead).4
His research includes constitutional theory, European integration theories, theories of collective identity.
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References
See Wolfgang Wagner, Die Konstruktion einer europäischen Außenpolitik — Deutsche, französische und britische Ansätze im Vergleich (2001). For other analytical approaches to CFSP, see also Michael E. Smith, The Framing of European foreign and security Policy: towards a post-modern policy framework?, 10 Journal of European Public Policy 556 (2003); Helene Sjursen, Understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Analytical Building Blocs, 9 ARENA Working Paper (2003), <http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp_03_9_sjursen.pdf>.
Wolfgang Wagner, Why the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy Will Remain Intergovernmental: A Rationalist Institutional Choice Analysis of European Crisis Management Policy, 10 Journal of European Public Policy 576 (2003).
Stanley Hoffmann, Obstinate or Obsolete: The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe, 95 Daedalus 865 (1966).
For the works of the leading neo-realist, see Joseph Grieco, The Maastricht Treaty. Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme, 21 Review of International Studies 21 (1995).
The numbering and the wording of the Articles correspond to the final version of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe as delivered by the IGC. I will use the name Constitutional Treaty (CT), whenever referring to it. The final document was signed in Rome on 29 October 2004. See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 53. With regard to the earlier version of the Constitutional Treaty, as delivered by the European Convention, I will use the name Draft Constitutional Treaty (DCT) to underline that the European Convention has proposed the provisions. The Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was adopted by the European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003 and submitted to the President of the European Council in Rome.
See, e.g., Integration durch Verfassung (Hans Vorländer ed., 2002), Gary S. Schaal, Vertrauen, Verfassung und Demokratie (2004), Petra Dobner, Konstitutionalismus als Politikform (2002).
Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, Konstytucjonalizacja Unii Europejskiej a jej rozszerzenie na wschód (Constitutionalization of the European Union and its Eastern Enlargement), 1 Nowa Europa 171 (2005).
Many critics of CFSP saw the reluctance of the member states to permit the delegation of sovereignty to centralized institutions as a main problem and thus the main source of failure of CFSP, which has been diagnosed with an inability to be “[...] an effective international actor, in terms both of its capacity to produce collective decisions and its impact on events”. See Christopher Hill, The Capability-expectations gap, or conceptualising Europe’s international role, 31 Journal of Common Market Studies 305 (1993). See also Philip H. Gordon, Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy, 22 International Security 74 (1997).
For the conceptualization of delegating versus pooling, see Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht 67 (1998).
See Heinz Kleger et al., Europäische Verfassung — Zum Stand der europäischen Demokratie im Zuge der Osterweiterung (2004).
With regard to the EU, see Jürgen Habermas, Braucht Europa eine Verfassung? Eine Bemerkung zu Dieter Grimm, in: Die Einbeziehung des Anderen (1996). For the general relationship between constitution and identity, see André Brodocz, Die symbolische Dimension der Verfassung (2003).
I will not examine the debates and controversies in the European Convention itself. For this purpose, see Der Konvent als Labor — Texte und Dokumente zum europäischen Verfassungsprozess (Heinz Kleger ed., 2004).
See Simon Duke, The Convention, the draft Constitution and External Relations: Effects and Implications for the EU and its international role, European Institute of Public Administration, 2003/W/2 Working Paper (2003), http://www.eipa.nl/Publications/Summaries/03/WorkingPaper/2003w02.pdf.
See, e.g., Jon Elster, Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea, 71 Public Administration 169 (1993).
See Erik O. Eriksen et at, The Charter of Fundamental Rights in Context, in: The Chartering of Europe: The European Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Constitutional Implications, 17 (Erik O. Eriksen et al. eds., 2003); Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (2001).
See Daniel Thym, Reforming Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, 10 European Law Journal 5 (2004).
See Duke, supra note 13, at 32.
See Christopher Hill, CFSP: Conventions, Constitutions and Consequentially, XXXII International Spectator No. 4, 75 (2002).
Petersberg tasks include, above all, humanitarian and rescue missions. See Martin Ortega, Petersberg Tasks, and Missions for the EU Military Forces, Working Paper (2005), Institute for Security Studies, Paris, <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/04-mo.pdf>.
Ulf Brunnbauer, The Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement: Ethnic Macedonian Resentments, 1 Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (2002).
Udo Diedrichs and Matthias Jopp, Flexible Modes of Governance: Making CFSP and ESDP Work, 2 The International Spectator 15 (2003). See Kathrin Blanck, Flexible Integration in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 61 Europainstitut Working Paper (2004), Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, <http://fgr.wu-wien.ac.at/institut/ef/wp/wp61.pdf>.
See Burkhard Schmitt, The European Union and Armaments: Getting a Bigger Bang for the Euro, 63 Chaillot Papers (2003), Institute for Security Studies, Paris, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai63e.pdf>.
Addendum to the Presidency Note, Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member Sates, CIG 60/03 ADD 1, Brussels, 9 December 2003.
Diedrichs andjopp, supra Matthias Jopp, Flexible Modes of Governance: Making CFSP and ESDP Work, 2 The International Spectator (2003) note 24, at 15.
See Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993).
See Willem F. van Eekelen, The Parliamentary Dimension of Defence Procurement, 5 Occasional Paper (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2005, <http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/Publications%20New/Occasional_Papers/5.pdf>).
See Daniel Thym, Parlamentsfreier Raum? Die Rolle des Europäischen Parlaments in der Gemeinsamen Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, <www.whi-berlin.de/EPinderGASP.htm>.
Kleger, supra note 12.
Bernhard Felderer et al, Draft Constitution: The Double Majority Implies a Massive Transfer of Power to the Large Member States — Is this Intended?, Institute for Advanced Studies (2003), Vienna, <http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/lib/forumljune2003.pdf>.
See Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, Convention as a New Method of Decision Making in the Enlarged European Union. How Democratic Can it Really Be?, Paper presented at the SGIR Conference “Constructing World Orders”, The Hague, 9–11 September 2004; Steven Everts and Daniel Keobane, The European Convention and EU foreign Policy: Learning from Failure, 45 Survival 3 (2003).
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Karolewski, I.P. (2006). Constitutionalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Implications of the Constitutional Treaty. In: Dann, P., Rynkowski, M. (eds) The Unity of the European Constitution. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, vol 186. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-37721-4_18
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