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The Emperor’s New Clothes: The ECB and the New Institutional Concept

  • Conference paper
The Unity of the European Constitution

Part of the book series: Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht ((BEITRÄGE,volume 186))

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Abstract

Taking a look at the ECB of today means, to a certain extent, rethinking the emperor’s idea. The European Central Bank is independent and seems almost untouchable in its field of responsibility. Its self-image is stamped by its special status outside the institutional structure of the European Union. However, the indefeasibility and with it the self-conception of the ECB was finally questioned by the European Court of Justice. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe designs a new institutional setting and possibly constitutes a new understanding. The question is to what extent does this new institutional setting redefine the special status of the ESCB and the ECB, and how does it affect questions of democratic accountability and legitimacy.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Public Law, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University, Frankfurt am Main

    Timo Tohidipur (Research Assistant and Lecturer)

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  1. Timo Tohidipur
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Philipp Dann Michał Rynkowski

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© 2006 Max-Planck-Gessellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V.

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Tohidipur, T. (2006). The Emperor’s New Clothes: The ECB and the New Institutional Concept. In: Dann, P., Rynkowski, M. (eds) The Unity of the European Constitution. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, vol 186. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-37721-4_12

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