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The Oz-E Project: Design Guidelines for a Secure Multiparadigm Programming Language

  • Fred Spiessens
  • Peter Van Roy
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3389)

Abstract

The design and implementation of a capability secure multi-paradigm language should be guided from its conception by proven principles of secure language design. In this position paper we present the Oz-E project, aimed at building an Oz-like secure language, named in tribute of E [MMF00] and its designers and users who contributed greatly to the ideas presented here.

We synthesize the principles for secure language design from the experiences with the capability-secure languages E and the W7-kernel for Scheme 48 [Ree96]. These principles will be used as primary guidelines during the project. We propose a layered structure for Oz-E and discuss some important security concerns, without aiming for completeness at this early stage.

Keywords

Design Guideline Covert Channel Secure Programming Abstract Syntax Tree Attack Node 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fred Spiessens
    • 1
  • Peter Van Roy
    • 1
  1. 1.Université catholique de LouvainLouvain-la-NeuveBelgium

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