For-LySa: UML for Authentication Analysis

  • Mikael Buchholtz
  • Carlo Montangero
  • Lara Perrone
  • Simone Semprini
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3267)


The DEGAS project aims at enriching standard UML-centred development environments in such a way that the developers of global applications can exploit automated formal analyses with minimal overhead. In this paper, we present For-LySa, an instantiation of the DEGAS approach for authentication analysis, which exploits an existing analysis tool developed for the process calculus LySa. We discuss what information is needed for the analysis, and how to build the UML model of an authentication protocol in such a way that the needed information can be extracted from the model. We then present our prototype implementation and report on some promising results of its use.


Authentication Protocol Security Protocol Sequence Diagram Incoming Message Process Calculus 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mikael Buchholtz
    • 1
  • Carlo Montangero
    • 2
  • Lara Perrone
    • 2
  • Simone Semprini
    • 3
  1. 1.Informatics and Mathematical ModellingTechnical University of DenmarkKgs. LyngbyDenmark
  2. 2.Dipartimento di InformaticaUniversità di PisaPisaItaly
  3. 3.Automated Reasoning Systems DivisionITC-IRSTPovo – TrentoItaly

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