Abstract
HAVAL is a cryptographic hash function proposed in 1992 by Zheng, Pieprzyk and Seberry. Its structure is quite similar to other widely used hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-1. The specification of HAVAL includes a security parameter: the number of passes (that is, the number of times that a particular word of the message is used in the computation) which can be chosen equal to 3, 4 or 5. In this paper we cryptanalyze the compression functions of the 4-pass and the 5-pass HAVAL using differential cryptanalysis. We show that each of these two functions can be distinguished from a truly random function.
This work was supported in part by the Concerted Research Action (GOA) Mefisto-2000/06 of the Flemish Government.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Biham, E., Shamir, A.: Differential Cryptanalysis of the Data Encryption Standard. Springer, Heidelberg (1993)
Biryukov, A., Wagner, D.: Advanced slide attacks. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 589–606. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
den Boer, B., Bosselaers, A.: Collisions for the compression function of MD5. In: Helleseth, T. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1993. LNCS, vol. 765, pp. 293–304. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)
Damgård, I.: A design principle for hash functions. In: Brassard, G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1989. LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 416–427. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)
Dobbertin, H.: The status of MD5 after a recent attack. Cryptobytes 2(2), 1–6 (1996)
Gilbert, H., Handschuh, H.: Security Analysis of SHA-256 and Sisters. In: Matsui, M., Zuccherato, R.J. (eds.) SAC 2003. LNCS, vol. 3006, pp. 175–193. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Handschuh, H., Naccache, D.: SHACAL, Submission to the NESSIE project (2000), Available from http://www.gemplus.com/smart/r_d/publications/pdf/HN00shac.pdf
Her, Y.-S., Sakurai, K., Kim, S.-H.: Attacks for finding collision in reduced versions of 3-pass and 4-pass HAVAL. International Conference on Computers, Communications and Systems CE-15, 75–78 (2003)
Calyptix Security, HAVAL source code (reference implementation), available at http://www.calyptix.com/downloads.html
Kasselman, P., Penzhorn, W.: Cryptanalysis of reduced version of HAVAL. Electronics letters 36(1), 30–31 (2000)
Lai, X., Massey, J.: Markov Ciphers and Differential Cryptanalysis. In: Davies, D.W. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1991. LNCS, vol. 547, pp. 17–38. Springer, Heidelberg (1991)
Menezes, A., van Oorschot, P., Vanstone, S.: Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, Boca Raton (1997)
Park, S., Sung, S.H., Chee, S., Lim, J.: On the security of reduced versions of 3-pass HAVAL. In: Batten, L.M., Seberry, J. (eds.) ACISP 2002. LNCS, vol. 2384, pp. 406–419. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Rivest, R.: The MD5 message-digest algorithm. Request for Comments (RFC) 1321, Internet Activities Board, Internet Privacy Task Force (April 1992)
van Rompay, B., Biryukov, A., Preneel, B., Vandewalle, J.: Cryptanalysis of 3-Pass HAVAL. In: Laih, C.-S. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2003. LNCS, vol. 2894, pp. 228–245. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
National Institute of Standards and Technology, FIPS-180-2: Secure Hash Standard (SHS) (August 2002)
Saarinen, M.: Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers Based on SHA-1 and MD5. In: Johansson, T. (ed.) FSE 2003. LNCS, vol. 2887, pp. 36–44. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Zheng, Y., Pieprzyk, J., Seberry, J.: HAVAL – a one-way hashing algorithm with variable length of output. In: Zheng, Y., Seberry, J. (eds.) AUSCRYPT 1992. LNCS, vol. 718, pp. 83–104. Springer, Heidelberg (1993)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Yoshida, H., Biryukov, A., De Cannière, C., Lano, J., Preneel, B. (2005). Non-randomness of the Full 4 and 5-Pass HAVAL. In: Blundo, C., Cimato, S. (eds) Security in Communication Networks. SCN 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3352. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30598-9_23
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30598-9_23
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-24301-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-30598-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)