Abstract
A negotiation agent exchanges proposals, supported by claims, with an opponent. Each proposal and claim exchanged reveals valuable information about the sender’s position. A negotiation may brake down if an agent believes that its opponent is not playing fairly. The agent aims to give the impression of fair play by responding with comparable information revelation whilst playing strategically to influence its opponent’s preferences with claims. It uses maximum entropy probabilistic reasoning to estimate unknown values inprobability distributions including the probability that its opponent will accept any deal.
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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Debenham, J. (2004). A Negotiation Agent. In: Webb, G.I., Yu, X. (eds) AI 2004: Advances in Artificial Intelligence. AI 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3339. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30549-1_78
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30549-1_78
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-24059-4
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