We use linear time temporal logic formulas to model strategic and extensive form games. This allows us to use temporal tableau to reason about the game structure. We order the nodes of the tableau according to the players’ preferences. Using this, we can derive a decision procedure for reasoning about the equilibria of these games. The main result developed in this paper is that every finite game can be converted into an equivalent bargaining game on temporal tableau, where the players negotiate the equilbrium outcome. The decision method proposed in this paper has a number of merits compared to others that can be found in the growing literature connecting games to logic – it captures a wide variety of game forms, it is easy to understand and implement, and it can be enhanced to take into account bounded rationality assumptions.


Nash Equilibrium Temporal Logic Strategic Game Chain Store Strongly Connect Component 
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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • G. Venkatesh
    • 1
  1. 1.Indian Institute of ManagementBangaloreIndia

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