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Controlled Declassification Based on Intransitive Noninterference

  • Heiko Mantel
  • David Sands
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3302)

Abstract

Traditional noninterference cannot cope with common features of secure systems like channel control, information filtering, or explicit downgrading. Recent research has addressed the derivation and use of weaker security conditions that could support such features in a language-based setting. However, a fully satisfactory solution to the problem has yet to be found. A key problem is to permit exceptions to a given security policy without permitting too much. In this article, we propose an approach that draws its underlying ideas from intransitive noninterference, a concept usually used on a more abstract specification level. Our results include a new bisimulation-based security condition that controls tightly where downgrading can occur and a sound security type system for checking this condition.

Keywords

Security Policy Security Level Security Condition Covert Channel Security Domain 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Heiko Mantel
    • 1
  • David Sands
    • 2
  1. 1.Information SecurityETH ZürichSwitzerland
  2. 2.Chalmers University of TechnologyGöteborgSweden

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