Abstract
Incentive scheme for stimulating service provision in Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANET) has been under intensive investigation due to its significance to the operation of MANET. This paper applies distributed algorithmic mechanism design and utilizes Vickrey auction for service allocation in mobile ad hoc networks. We show that our method stimulates service provision and achieves desired system-wide service allocation in spite of each agent’s selfish behavior, while introducing challenges from the inherent shortcomings of Vickrey auction and characteristics of MANET. We discuss the challenges, the existing solutions for wireline networks and propose a system model for service allocation in MANET.
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Liu, J., Issarny, V. (2004). Service Allocation in Selfish Mobile Ad hoc Networks Using Vickrey Auction. In: Lindner, W., Mesiti, M., Türker, C., Tzitzikas, Y., Vakali, A.I. (eds) Current Trends in Database Technology - EDBT 2004 Workshops. EDBT 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3268. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30192-9_38
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30192-9_38
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