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Integrating a Security Requirement Language with UML

  • H. Abie
  • D. B. Aredo
  • T. Kristoffersen
  • S. Mazaher
  • T. Raguin
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3273)

Abstract

We present an approach that integrates a language for precise and high-level specification of application security requirements, the Security Requirement Language (SRL), with an existing modeling technique, namely, the Unified Modeling Language (UML). SRL is based on first-order logic extended with a small set of modal operators and a syntactic abstraction mechanism. It offers extensibility in that new application/domain-specific requirements can be defined and reused. The focus of SRL is the security of communication in distributed systems. The integrated framework enables developers to add to system models security requirements, such as confidentiality, non-repudiation, and authentication, at an early stage of development, making security an integral part of the system development process. We illustrate the practical usability of our approach by presenting an example, and discuss the experiences that the users of our approach, i.e., system developers, have reported.

Keywords

Security Requirement Security Protocol Sequence Diagram Cryptographic Protocol Integration Methodology 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • H. Abie
    • 1
  • D. B. Aredo
    • 1
  • T. Kristoffersen
    • 1
  • S. Mazaher
    • 1
  • T. Raguin
    • 2
  1. 1.Norwegian Computing CenterBlindern, OsloNorway
  2. 2.NetUnion sarlLausanneSwitzerland

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