Abstract
Password-based authenticated group key exchange (denoted by PGKE) provides n parties holding a common human-memorable password with secure group communication. Most PGKE protocols proposed so far are inefficient since they require O(n) communication rounds where n is the number of group members. In the paper, we propose the first 2-round PGKE protocol with 3-exponentiations required per user and prove its security in the random oracle model and the ideal cipher model under the intractability of the decision Diffie-Hellman problem and computation Diffie-Hellman problem. The proposed protocol also provides forward secrecy.
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Lee, S.M., Hwang, J.Y., Lee, D.H. (2004). Efficient Password-Based Group Key Exchange. In: Katsikas, S., Lopez, J., Pernul, G. (eds) Trust and Privacy in Digital Business. TrustBus 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3184. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30079-3_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30079-3_20
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