Abstract
An n-person game in strategic (or normal) form. If all the strategy sets S i have a finite number of elements, the game is called finite. Definition of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for an n-person game. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. (There will usually be several Nash equilibria.)
Keywords
- Nash Equilibrium
- Mixed Strategy
- Pure Strategy
- Evolutionary Game Theory
- Strategy Nash Equilibrium
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References
Friedman (1986) is a standard reference. See also Gibbons (1992) (the simplest treatment), Kreps (1990), and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). For evolutionary game theory, see Weibull (1995). For games of incomplete information, see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995).
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© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Sydsæter, K., Strøm, A., Berck, P. (2010). Non-cooperative game theory. In: Economists’ Mathematical Manual. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-28518-2_31
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-28518-2_31
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-26088-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-28518-2
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