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Coordination Mechanisms

  • George Christodoulou
  • Elias Koutsoupias
  • Akash Nanavati
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3142)

Abstract

We introduce the notion of coordination mechanisms to improve the performance in systems with independent selfish and non-colluding agents. The quality of a coordination mechanism is measured by its price of anarchy—the worst-case performance of a Nash equilibrium over the (centrally controlled) social optimum. We give upper and lower bounds for the price of anarchy for selfish task allocation and congestion games.

Keywords

Cost Function Nash Equilibrium Social Cost Schedule Policy Competitive Ratio 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • George Christodoulou
    • 1
  • Elias Koutsoupias
    • 1
  • Akash Nanavati
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of InformaticsUniversity of AthensAthensGreece
  2. 2.Computer Science DepartmentUniversity of California Los AngelesLos AngelesUSA.

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