Advertisement

Group Spreading: A Protocol for Provably Secure Distributed Name Service

  • Baruch Awerbuch
  • Christian Scheideler
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3142)

Abstract

This paper presents a method called Group Spreading that provides a scalable distributed name service that survives even massive Byzantine attacks. To accomplish this goal, this paper introduces a new methodology that essentially maintains a random distribution of all (honest and Byzantine) peers in an overlay network for any sequence of arrivals and departures of peers up to a certain rate, under a reasonable assumption that Byzantine peers are a sufficient minority. The random distribution allows to proactively protect the system from any adversarial attack within our model.

Keywords

Hash Function Overlay Network Honest Node Connection Table Group Spreading 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Awerbuch, B., Scheideler, C.: Robust distributed name service. In: Voelker, G.M., Shenker, S. (eds.) IPTPS 2004. LNCS, vol. 3279, pp. 237–249. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Canetti, R., Gennaro, R., Herzberg, A., Naor, D.: Proactive security: Long-term protection against break-ins. RSA CryptoBytes 3(1), 1–8 (1997)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Castro, M., Druschel, P., Ganesh, A., Rowstron, A., Wallach, D.: Secure routing for structured peer-to-peer overlay networks. In: Proc. of the 5th Usenix Symp. on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, OSDI (2002)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Castro, M., Liskov, B.: Practical Byzantine fault tolerance. In: Proc. of the 2nd Usenix Symp. on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, OSDI (1999)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Crosby, S., Wallach, D.: Denial of service via algorithmic complexity attacks. In: Usenix Security (2003)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Douceur, J.R.: The sybil attack. In: Druschel, P., Kaashoek, M.F., Rowstron, A. (eds.) IPTPS 2002. LNCS, vol. 2429, p. 251. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Druschel, P., Rowstron, A.: Pastry: Scalable, distributed object location and routing for large-scale peer-to-peer systems. In: Guerraoui, R. (ed.) Middleware 2001. LNCS, vol. 2218, p. 329. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Fiat, A., Saia, J.: Censorship resistant peer-to-peer content addressable networks. In: Proc. of the 13th ACM Symp. on Discrete Algorithms, SODA (2002)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Frankel, Y., Gemmell, P., MacKenzie, P.D., Yung, M.: Optimal resilience proactive public-key cryptosystems. In: Proc. of the 38th IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 384–393 (1997)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Herzberg, A., Jakobsson, M., Jarecki, S., Krawczyk, H., Yung, M.: Proactive public key and signature systems. In: Proc. of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), pp. 100–110 (1997)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Herzberg, A., Jarecki, S., Krawczyk, H., Yung, M.: Proactive secret sharing or: How to cope with perpetual leakage. In: Coppersmith, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 1995. LNCS, vol. 963, pp. 339–352. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Lamport, L.: The weak Byzantine generals problem. Journal of the ACM 30(3), 669–676 (1983)CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Lamport, L., Lynch, N.: Handbook on Theoretical Computer Science. In: Distributed computing; Also, to be published as Technical Memo MIT/LCS/TM- 384, Laboratory for Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA (1989)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Naor, M., Wieder, U.: Novel architectures for P2P applications: the continuousdiscrete approach. In: Proc. of the 15th ACM Symp. on Parallel Algorithms and Architectures, SPAA (2003)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Ostrovsky, R., Yung, M.: How to withstand mobile virus attacks. In: Proc. of the 10th ACM Symp. on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), pp. 51–59 (1991)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    De Prisco, R., Lampson, B.W., Lynch, N.: Revisiting the Paxos algorithm. In: Workshop on Distributed Algorithms, pp. 111–125 (1997)Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Stoica, I., Morris, R., Karger, D., Kaashoek, M.F., Balakrishnan, H.: Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for Internet applications. In: Proc. of the ACM SIGCOMM 2001 (2001)Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Zhao, B.Y., Kubiatowicz, J., Joseph, A.: Tapestry: An infrastructure for faulttolerant wide-area location and routing. Technical report, University of California at Berkeley, Computer Science Department (2001)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Baruch Awerbuch
    • 1
  • Christian Scheideler
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceJohns Hopkins UniversityBaltimoreUSA

Personalised recommendations