The Power of Verification for One-Parameter Agents

  • Vincenzo Auletta
  • Roberto De Prisco
  • Paolo Penna
  • Giuseppe Persiano
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3142)


We study combinatorial optimization problems involving one-parameter selfish agents considered by Archer and Tardos [FOCS 2001]. In particular, we show that, if agents can lie in one direction (that is they either overbid or underbid) then any (polynomial-time) c-approximation algorithm, for the optimization problem without selfish agents, can be turned into a (polynomial-time) c(1+ε)-approximation truthful mechanism, for any ε >0. We then look at the Q||C max problem in the case of agents owning machines of different speeds. We consider the model in which payments are given to the agents only after the machines have completed the jobs assigned. This means that for each machine that receives at least one job, the mechanism can verify if the corresponding agent declared a greater speed. For this setting, we characterize the allocation algorithms A that admit a payment function P such that M=(A,P) is a truthful mechanism. In addition, we give a (1+ε)-approximation truthful mechanism for Q||C max when machine speeds are bounded by a constant. Finally, we consider the classical scheduling problem Q|| ∑ w j C j which does not admit an exact mechanism if verification is not allowed. By contrast, we show that an exact mechanism for Q|| ∑ w j C j exists when verification is allowed.


Combinatorial Optimization Problem Allocation Algorithm Positive Load Adjustment Phase Weakly Monotone 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vincenzo Auletta
    • 1
  • Roberto De Prisco
    • 1
  • Paolo Penna
    • 1
  • Giuseppe Persiano
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di Informatica ed Applicazioni “R.M. Capocelli”Università di SalernoBaronissiItaly

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