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Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Mix Systems

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Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS,volume 3110)

Abstract

A mix is a communication proxy that attempts to hide the correspondence between its incoming and outgoing messages. Timing attacks are a significant challenge for mix-based systems that wish to support interactive, low-latency applications. However, the potency of these attacks has not been studied carefully. In this paper, we investigate timing analysis attacks on low-latency mix systems and clarify the threat they pose. We propose a novel technique, defensive dropping, to thwart timing attacks. Through simulations and analysis, we show that defensive dropping can be effective against attackers who employ timing analysis.

Keywords

  • Receiver Operator Characteristic Curve
  • Timing Analysis
  • Timing Attack
  • False Negative Rate
  • Drop Rate

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Levine, B.N., Reiter, M.K., Wang, C., Wright, M. (2004). Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Mix Systems. In: Juels, A. (eds) Financial Cryptography. FC 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3110. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27809-2_25

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27809-2_25

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-22420-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-27809-2

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