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Trust Management in Strand Spaces: A Rely-Guarantee Method

  • Joshua D. Guttman
  • F. Javier Thayer
  • Jay A. Carlson
  • Jonathan C. Herzog
  • John D. Ramsdell
  • Brian T. Sniffen
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2986)

Abstract

We show how to combine trust management theories with nonce-based cryptographic protocols. The strand space framework for protocol analysis is extended by associating formulas from a trust management logic with the transmit and receive actions of the protocol principals. The formula on a transmission is a guarantee; the sender must ensure that this formula is true before sending the message. The formula on a receive event is an assumption that the recipient may rely on in deducing future guarantee formulas. The strand space framework allows us to prove that a protocol is sound, in the sense that when a principal relies on a formula, another principal has previously guaranteed it. We explain the ideas in reference to a simple new electronic commerce protocol, in which a customer obtains a money order from a bank to pay a merchant to ship some goods.

Keywords

Trust Management Computer Security Message Transmission Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Protocol 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joshua D. Guttman
    • 1
  • F. Javier Thayer
    • 1
  • Jay A. Carlson
    • 1
  • Jonathan C. Herzog
    • 1
  • John D. Ramsdell
    • 1
  • Brian T. Sniffen
    • 1
  1. 1.The MITRE Corporation 

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