Abstract
This Chapter presents recent strategic models of coalition and network formation, with two applications to industrial organization: the formation of cartels and strategic alliances.
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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Bloch, F. (2004). Coalitions and Networks in Economic Analysis. In: Bourgine, P., Nadal, JP. (eds) Cognitive Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24708-1_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24708-1_24
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-07336-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24708-1
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