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Experimental Markets: Empirical Data for Theorists

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Cognitive Economics

Abstract

Economic experiments can provide data of interest to cognitive economists. Likewise, cognitive economics is well-suited to the explanation of some types of experimental data. In this Chapter, we survey the principal results that have been obtained from experimental research on markets. The contrast in behavior between service and asset markets is presented as a phenomenon that might be investigated by cognitive economists. We also describe some recent developments in the experimental study of games and summarize some of the principal general ideas that have emerged.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, 30322-2240, USA

    Charles Noussair

  2. INRA-GAEL, Université Pierre Mendès France, Ecole Nationale Supérieure de Génie Industriel, 46 Avenue Félix Viallet, Grenoble, France

    Bernard Ruffieux

Authors
  1. Charles Noussair
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  2. Bernard Ruffieux
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. École Polytechnique, CNRS CREA, 1, rue Descartes, 75005, Paris, France

    Paul Bourgine

  2. École Normale Supérieure, LPS (CNRS UMR8550) and CENECC, 24, rue Lhomond, 75231, Paris CEDEX 05, France

    Jean-Pierre Nadal

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Noussair, C., Ruffieux, B. (2004). Experimental Markets: Empirical Data for Theorists. In: Bourgine, P., Nadal, JP. (eds) Cognitive Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24708-1_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24708-1_19

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-07336-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24708-1

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