Abstract
The formal and computational views of cryptography have been related by the seminal work of Abadi and Rogaway. In their work, a formal treatment of encryption that uses atomic keys is justified in the computational world. However, many proposed formal approaches allow the use of composed keys, where any arbitrary expression can be used as encryption key. In this paper we consider an extension of the formal model presented by Abadi and Rogaway, in which it is allowed to use composed keys in formal encryption. We then provide a computational interpretation for expressions that allow us to establish the computational soundness of formal encryption with composed keys.
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Laud, P., Corin, R. (2004). Sound Computational Interpretation of Formal Encryption with Composed Keys. In: Lim, JI., Lee, DH. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2003. ICISC 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2971. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_5
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