Abstract
In this paper, we propose a new primitive called non interactive deniable ring authentication: it is possible to convince a verifier that a member of an ad hoc collection of participants is authenticating a message m without revealing which one and the verifier V cannot convince any third party that the message m was indeed authenticated in a non-interactive way. Unlike the deniable ring authentication proposed [19], we require this primitive to be non-interactive. Having this restriction, the primitive can be used in practice without having to use the anonymous routing channel (eg. MIX-nets) introduced [19]. In this paper, we provide the formal definition of non-interactive deniable ring authentication schemes together with a generic construction of such schemes from any ring signature schemes. The generic construction can be used to convert any existing ring signature schemes for example [20, 1], to non-interactive deniable ring authentication schemes. We also present an extension of this idea to allow a non-interactive deniable ring to threshold ring authentication. In this scenario, the signature can convince a group of verifiers, but the verifiers cannot convince any other third party about this fact, because any collusion of t verifiers can always generate a valid message-signature pair. We also present a generic construction of this scheme. A special case of this scenario is a deniable ring-to-ring authentication scheme, where the collaboration of all verifiers is required to generate a valid message-signature pair.
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Susilo, W., Mu, Y. (2004). Non-interactive Deniable Ring Authentication. In: Lim, JI., Lee, DH. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2003. ICISC 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2971. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_29
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