Providing Receipt-Freeness in Mixnet-Based Voting Protocols

  • Byoungcheon Lee
  • Colin Boyd
  • Ed Dawson
  • Kwangjo Kim
  • Jeongmo Yang
  • Seungjae Yoo
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2971)

Abstract

It had been thought that it is difficult to provide receipt-freeness in mixnet-based electronic voting schemes. Any kind of user chosen randomness can be used to construct a receipt, since a user can prove to a buyer how he had encrypted the ballot. In this paper we propose a simple and efficient method to incorporate receipt-freeness in mixnet-based electronic voting schemes by using the well known re-encryption technique and designated verifier re-encryption proof (DVRP). In our scheme a voter has to prepare his encrypted ballot through a randomization service provided by a tamper resistant randomizer (TRR), in such a way that he finally loses his knowledge on randomness. This method can be used in most mixnet-based electronic voting scheme to provide receipt-freeness.

Keywords

Electronic voting Receipt-freeness Mixnet Re-encryption Designated-verifier re-encryption proof Tamper resistant randomizer 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Byoungcheon Lee
    • 1
    • 2
  • Colin Boyd
    • 1
  • Ed Dawson
    • 1
  • Kwangjo Kim
    • 3
  • Jeongmo Yang
    • 2
  • Seungjae Yoo
    • 2
  1. 1.Information Security Research CenterQueensland University of TechnologyBrisbaneAustralia
  2. 2.Joongbu UniversityChungnamKorea
  3. 3.Information and Communications UniversityDaejeonKorea

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