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Simpler Session-Key Generation from Short Random Passwords

  • Minh-Huyen Nguyen
  • Salil Vadhan
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2951)

Abstract

Goldreich and Lindell (CRYPTO ‘01) recently presented the first protocol for password-authenticated key exchange in the standard model (with no common reference string or set-up assumptions other than the shared password). However, their protocol uses several heavy tools and has a complicated analysis.

We present a simplification of the Goldreich–Lindell (GL) protocol and analysis for the special case when the dictionary is of the form \(\mathcal{D} = \{0,1\}^d\), i.e. the password is a short random string (like an ATM PIN number). Our protocol can be converted into one for arbitrary dictionaries using a common reference string of logarithmic length. The security bound achieved by our protocol is somewhat worse than the GL protocol. Roughly speaking, our protocol guarantees that the adversary can “break” the scheme with probability at most \(O({\rm poly}(n)/|\mathcal{D}|)^{\Omega(1)}\), whereas the GL protocol guarantees a bound of \(O(1/|\mathcal{D}|)\).

We also present an alternative, more natural definition of security than the “augmented definition” of Goldreich and Lindell, and prove that the two definitions are equivalent.

Keywords

Random String Polynomial Evaluation Auxiliary Input Common Reference String Passive Adversary 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Minh-Huyen Nguyen
    • 1
  • Salil Vadhan
    • 1
  1. 1.Harvard UniversityCambridge

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