Abstract
The previous two chapters offered a detailed description and analysis of water governance and water institutional reforms in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This chapter aims to compare the similarities and differences in both countries and to assess to what extent the identified variables are able to explain them. The first section compares the water governance structures and the water institutional reforms in both states, thus the dependent variable (chapter 8.1). The next part (8.2) discusses the role neopatrimonial features play and how donor policies interfere with them. Subsequently, three sub-chapters sum up the reform experience in both countries under three thematic foci: first, the introduction of monetary economic mechanism (8.3); second, the introduction of new administrative principles, namely hydrographic and inter-sectoral management approaches (8.4); and third, the involvement of stakeholders by way of user participation and decentralization (8.5). After this comparison of the empirical findings, we will turn to the theoretical assumptions formulated in the beginning. What do these cases tell us about institutional change? Where can we identify path-dependent developments? What was the impact of the juncture both countries experienced — was it critical? And finally, is the ultimate result an outcome of path dependency, of path change, or of institutional bricolage? This will be discussed in chapter 8.6. The final section of this comparative part (8.7) will address the question of which lessons can be learned from this analysis and should be considered when conducting water institutional reforms.
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References
Concerning the regional dimension of transboundary water management, which receives so much attention in Kyrgyzstan, this point is not such a prominent and especially not such an ideologized issue in political debate. Despite the perception of a certain unfairness as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan do not provide cost recovery mechanisms for O&M of the Kairakum reservoir, Tajikistan still regulates it according to the irrigation modus out of ‘tradition’ and to show good will (Petrov 2003, author’s interview with a representative of the EC-IFAS, Dushanbe, 10/21/2003). Although in Tajikistan as well certain actors perceive that the country is in an unjust position and should try to get a bigger water quota or treat water as an economic good, this point of view didn’t gain access to the political discourse, as it does not promise to be politically lucrative in the momentous situation of Tajikistan.
In a study conducted by ASDP „NAU“ in the Zeravshan Valley in Tajikistan, none of the farmers interviewed were able to identify different species of wheat and potatoes and the amount of water required (ASDP „NAU“ 2003: 18).
Therefore, some scholars distinguish between a ‘method’ and a ‘process’ orientation in community development (Earle 2005; Freizer 2005): Are CBOs seen as an end in itself, i.e. is the empowerment of local communities the main target, or are CBOs mainly seen as a means to reach more ownership and more sustainability of projects? The latter is the approach of many donors that have rediscovered the CD approach since the end of the 1990s. On the one hand, this reflects the critique addressed to Western donors of trying to introduce Western concepts of civil society and neglecting ‘traditional’ civil society as represented in different informal institutions such as mahalla committees, aksakals or hashars. On the other hand, it often coincides with a romanticized notion of ‘community’ and its institutions, which neglects local power asymmetries and thereby sometimes strengthens them. Also in scientific research, not a few institutionalist studies that highlight indigenous or local strategies in natural resources management rest upon a naive and idealistic image of ‘community’ and neglect social hierarchies and power relations (Mehta 2000: 14f). At this point, it should be mentioned that my findings derive from one bottom-up developed WUA in Tajikistan and two top-down established ones in Kyrgyzstan. There is no substantial difference in that respect to observe. The question is whether these different approaches actually do make a difference or whether the local institutional setting is dominant. Further research would be necessary here. See for discussion also Platteau 2004 and Chhotray 2004.
For such an example see the case study in Earle 2005:252ff.
Author’s interview with a university professor, Bishkek, 10/01/2003.
Even Saudi-Arabia and Iran, which base their laws on the sharia, introduced water tariffs (Faruqui 2001: 13).
One staff member of Mercy Corps in Tajikistan developed a project proposal on cooperation with and training of imams for water awareness campaigns, which, however, was not realized (Mercy Corps n.d., author’s interview with a representative, Khudjand, 10/03/2005).
For a critical discussion of this approach in general see Bliss 2005.
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(2009). Comparing the Politics of Water Institutional Reform. In: The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91377-3_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91377-3_8
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