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Die Zukunft des Öffentlichen pp 84–106Cite as

Geldpolitik und Öffentlickeit— Anmerkungen zur Kommunikationsstrategie der Europäischen Zentralbank

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In folgendem Aufsatz soll herausgearbeitet werden, was auf dem Feld der Geldpolitik unter dem Begriff Öffentlichkeit verstanden wird und warum im europäischen Zentralbankwesen dem kohärenten, systematischen Umgang mit Öffentlichkeit eine strategische Komponente beigemessen wurde, wird und auch in Zukunft werden sollte.

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Authors
  1. Barbara Drexler
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Stephan A. Jansen Birger P. Priddat Nico Stehr

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© 2007 VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | GWV Fachverlag GmbH, Wiesbaden

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Drexler, B. (2007). Geldpolitik und Öffentlickeit— Anmerkungen zur Kommunikationsstrategie der Europäischen Zentralbank. In: Jansen, S.A., Priddat, B.P., Stehr, N. (eds) Die Zukunft des Öffentlichen. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90501-3_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90501-3_4

  • Publisher Name: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-531-15282-0

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